West Papuan delegates from the WPNCL at the MSG plenary session at the SPC, Noumea 2013 – Photo by Ben Bohane

By Ben Bohane

Among those clinking glasses to celebrate 25^th anniversary of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) at the recent summit in Noumea were leaders of West Papua.

For the first time the West Papuan issue was front and centre at this regional meeting, after decades of being ignored by the metropolitan powers and swept under the tapa mat by the Pacific Islands Forum and other regional organisations.

This year marks the 50^th anniversary of the Indonesian takeover of Dutch New Guinea, when Jakarta assumed control on the 1^st May 1963. Since then Church groups and NGOs estimate at least 200,000 people have perished in a low-intensity guerilla conflict as West Papuans have waged their struggle for independence while Indonesian settlers have now made Papuans a minority in their own land.

Now it looks like momentum is building for this territory to go back onto the UN decolonization list, just as Tahiti was recently re-admitted.

After submitting their application for membership, the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) were initially disappointed following the announcement made at the Foreign Ministers meeting, as the MSG summit began, that the decision on their membership had been deferred. This followed a recommendation by Fiji and Indonesia that the decision on membership be made after a special visit by an MSG delegation to Jakarta and Jayapura within the next six months.

After decades of claiming West Papua was an internal domestic issue for Indonesia alone, it is clear that this is no longer the case. For the first time Indonesia has grasped that not only is this now a regional, and international issue, but that it is also one moving beyond Jakarta’s control. They sent a large delegation to Noumea, far more than any other nation – and for weeks before the summit Indonesia mounted a serious foreign policy blitz among Melanesian countries to try and influence the outcome. Bi-laterals with Fiji, a red-carpet state visit for the PNG government during the exact same dates as the MSG summit and behind the scenes maneuvering in Vanuatu to topple the pro-West Papua government of Prime Minister Moanna Carcassas Kalosil all hinted at the extent to which Indonesia attempted to shut down any MSG recognition for West Papua.

In the end they got a measure of victory in getting Fiji to convince the other MSG countries that membership be deferred until after a special visit to the province. Another victory for Jakarta was in persuading the PNG government of Peter O’Neill to lead a 100-plus delegation of government and business leaders to be wined and dined in Jakarta for exactly the same dates as the summit. This raised many eyebrows in Noumea.

Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare of PNG, who attended the summit as a Founding Father, was himself angry at PNG’s lack of representation to this important summit – not just at Peter O’Neill’s decision to choose Indonesia over Melanesia, but that no-one from the PNG delegation showed up for the closing ceremony at the Tjibaou cultural centre, after the deputy Prime Minister fell sick. At the closing ceremony, without PNG’s signature, other MSG leaders signed a joint document committing the MSG to further supporting the FLNKS in New Caledonia. In a significant shift in his own policy, Sir Michael said it was time to allow the West Papuans into the MSG family, something he opposed in the past.

Following the final plenary session held at the SPC (Secretariat for the Pacific Community) it became clear where the divisions lay within the MSG. PNG and Fiji affirmed Indonesian sovereignty and tried to water down MSG support, while Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and the FLNKS in New Caledonia all made strong representations on West Papua’s behalf.

While Indonesia achieved the early victory over membership deferral, the West Papuans clearly had a win with the wording in the final MSG Communique. Here it states in section 21 of the document:

Leaders:

(i)  endorsed that the MSG fully supports the inalienable rights of the people of West Papua towards self-determination as provided for under the preamble of the MSG constitution;

(ii)  endorsed that the concerns of the MSG regarding the human rights violations and other forms of atrocities relating to the West Papuan people be raised with the Government of Indonesia bilaterally and as a Group;

(iii)  noted the application received from the WPNCL to be a member of the MSG and that the application will be reviewed after the submission of the Ministerial Mission’s report; and

(iv)  approved the Roadmap as recommended by the FMM which included:

a)  that the MSG send a Ministerial Mission at the FMM level to be led by Fiji’s Foreign Minister to Jakarta and then to West Papua in 2013 and accept the 
invitation of the Government of Indonesia;

b)  the Ministerial Mission to present its report to the Leaders at the earliest 
opportunity within the next six months;

c)  the WPNCL to be officially informed of the MSG Leaders’ decision regarding 
its application; and

d)  the Mission would be part of a process in determining WPNCL’s membership 
application.

Sensing the divisive nature of this issue, the MSG Secretariat was able to produce an outcome that is sensitive to all the key players involved and did well to strike a balanced position. It affirms the need for dialogue between MSG nations and Indonesia over the West Papuan issue. It offers Indonesia a window in coming months to improve conditions on the ground and prepare a good “dog and pony show” (as media sometimes refer to government public relations exercises) for MSG leaders when they visit.

At the same time, the West Papuans now have official recognition of sorts to keep building their diplomatic case. They are asking that media be allowed on the MSG visit to Jakarta and Jayapura and that delegates go with “open eyes”.

Indonesia’s most senior representative at the summit, Ambassador Wardana (Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs) made some compelling pleas to understand Indonesia’s position: that it was spending billions of rupiah on local government services; that it had localized important positions so that only ethnic Papuans could become Governor, and that President SBY has promised “Autonomy Plus” for Papua ahead of his visit there in August.

Yet for as long as killings, torture and imprisonment of Papuans by the Indonesian military continues and the entire province remains off-limits to all foreign media and NGOs including the Red Cross, Indonesia has a serious credibility problem. The advent of social media means that even banning foreign media has not stopped the daily reports and pictures of atrocities to be seen around the region. The fact that the MSG communiqué used undiplomatic words such as “atrocities” in the context of West Papua shows the level of concern they have.

The other victory for West Papuans at this summit revolves around unity and the legitimacy of the WPNCL to represent them. Despite efforts by some to question whether the WPNCL really represents the majority of Papuans, their delegates were able to furnish letters of support from more than 30 significant groups. Several prominent Papuan leaders who have publicly criticized the WPNCL in the past and were present at the summit praised the WPNCL. Jacob Rumbiak from a rival grouping said the WPNCL had done well to get their issue to this level.

Even Franz Albert Joku, a former independence advocate that has in the past decade supported Indonesia’s autonomy plan (and came with the Indonesian delegation), said external lobbying by WPNCL had improved conditions on the ground in West Papua because the Indonesian government now realised it had to do something to minimise the international campaign and win local hearts. Those pushing for autonomy inside recognize the strategic value of those on the outside pushing for independence to give them better leverage.

The MSG may well emerge as a key broker between Indonesia and Melanesia to help solve the West Papua question, raising the prestige of this key group now in its 25^th year. After a decade or two focused mainly on trade issues, it would appear the MSG has returned to its original political mandate – to build solidarity and integration between all Melanesian peoples and nations.

Introduction

I am deeply honoured at being invited by the FLNKS to be guest of honour at the ceremonies marking the end of the celebrations in all MSG countries of our Organisation’s 25 years of existence.

I know it sounds perfunctory but I am truly honoured because I note from the invitation letter that I am regarded as a founding father of MSG: a great recognition for which I am thankful.

While I, indeed, signed the Agreement formally establishing the MSG, the honour of conceiving this organisation rests with the late Fr Walter Lini, Honourable Pius Wingti and Honourable Ezekiel Alebua.  Both Wingti and Alebua, who are still with us today, would have been equally worthy guests.

I have been invited by the FLNKS to be here during their assumption of the Chairmanship of our Organisation for the next two years.  I consider the invitation deeply humbling as FLNKS interests gave us the reason to be an organisation.

I also consider it significant to be invited to this hallowed land of the Kanaky people – New Caledonia – whose future political status continues to occupy the central focus of our organisation’s political agenda.

MSG the last 25 years

Much has been said about the achievements of MSG over the last few months as we celebrated our 25 years anniversary in our various capitals.  I will therefore not dwell much on them today.

However, it is fair to say that from what started as a political sub-grouping, MSG’s cooperation now covers most areas of human pursuit and endeavour.

It is no exaggeration that MSG’s cooperative efforts in political and security, trade and economic, social, cultural and sports activities have increased and strengthened in ways that our founders never imagined.

I am told that even Honourable Ezekial Alebua admitted recently that when they first met in Goroka in 1986, he never imagined the MSG would grow from a simple political ‘pressure group’ to a vibrant and successful organisation as it is today.

We are the only sub-regional grouping within the Pacific Islands Forum area that has a formal Secretariat and Headquarters.

MSG into the future

I was fortunate to be given the opportunity to share my thoughts and listen to the EPG team established by our Leaders to draw up a vision and future plan for our organisation.

I was encouraged by what I heard.

MSG must be inclusive.  It must be compassionate.  It must have integrity.

All our efforts in regional cooperation and integration must mirror these principles.

Just as important is the principle that MSG must seek to help itself first.  MSG must only seek outside assistance if its own resources are inadequate or its capacity is found wanting.

Experience in our region and elsewhere suggest that this approach provides some insurance against outside influence – influence that could easily lead to distortion of MSG’s priorities and development agenda.

MSG must be in the driver’s seat.

As we search to find areas of common interest, to pursue our quest for more enhanced cooperation and deeper integration, we must ensure that our national resources and energies are not wasted.

Our MSG Secretariat, that is entrusted to help us in our undertaking to better serve our peoples, must be appropriately resourced to discharge its responsibilities.  To help improve communications and implementation of the work program, MSG members should seek to open resident representative officers in Port Vila.

The last 25 years have given us valuable experience on collective action in pursuit of identified development goals – be they political, economic, trade, social, cultural, etc.

That many of our neighbours, sub-groups and Melanesian communities elsewhere have expressed an interest in joining MSG is a strong validation of how well we have organised ourselves.  The interest shown manifest the value others attach to MSG’s role in the pursuit of common development objectives.

It is no exaggeration that some critics that initially thought the Melanesian Spearhead Group enterprise was overly ambitious now consider MSG cooperation as a viable enterprise in sub-regionalism in the Pacific.

MSG is fortunate in that it can, and must, extract lessons from the workings of PIF and learn from the experience of other similar organisations elsewhere.

We must avoid creating new MSG institutions to provide a public good or service if another regional or national institution is already providing them.  It is no epiphany to suggest that we would be better off accessing the services from the existing regional or national institutions.

What might be necessary, though, is to channel more resources to these institutions to bolster their capacity to better serve our collective interests and needs.

We must only create new institutions either because none exists to provide that public good or service – or if by doing so – it adds considerable value to existing efforts.

If experience elsewhere, by similar organisations like ours, demonstrate that binding ourselves to decisions would improve implementation of our initiatives then we should find ways to legally bind ourselves to the decisions we make.  This would help strengthen MSG’s credibility.

Political and Security

Political and Security concerns, namely Decolonisation of New Caledonia and cessation of nuclear testing in Mururuo were the main reasons MSG was formed.

New Caledonia’s right to self-determination, and independence, championed by the FLNKS, was perceived as not getting the serious attention it deserved.  In addition, the then MSG Leaders felt that some regional partners were undermining efforts to adopt a stronger position within the PIF.

New Caledonia’s re-inscription as a non-self-governing territory within the purview of the UN Committee of 24 is largely due to, the change in approach, and the concerted efforts of the MSG.

It is also arguable that the Noumea Accord, and the processes leading up to it, would not have come about without the deliberate international campaign mounted by the MSG countries in support of New Caledonia’s right to self-determination.  These included persistent representations to the Metropolitan Power and the United Nations.

The Noumea Accord offers a glimmer a hope for the Kanaky people and their aspirations.  It would be a sad indictment on MSG’s resolve if we do not ensure the FLNKS is positioned to win the Provincial Elections next year.  MSG has that obligation and, as a member, FLNKS is entitled to expect nothing less from the other MSG members.

MSG’s responsibility extends beyond the FLNKS leadership of today.

MSG owes it to the FLNKS leaders of yester years whose pioneering work has helped us come this far. At this juncture, I wish to pay tribute to the likes of Uregei, Machoro, Tjibao, Yeweni Yeweni and the young Kanaks in Ouvéa who paid the ultimate price for championing justice and the emancipation of the Kanaky people.

MSG countries owe it to the Kanaky people to remain true to their commitment to defend and promote independence as the inalienable right of indigenous peoples of Melanesia as espoused in the Agreement establishing our organisation.

Political and Parliamentary instability in MSG countries continue to undermine our efforts in promoting our region as a region of opportunity, stability and prosperity.

More energy must be directed in the next 25 years towards strengthening our governance institutions and good governance processes.

It is worth clarifying, though, that in many instances in MSG, political and parliamentary instability occur as a result of the democratic process at play, in particular the exercise of democratic rights.  They are not indicative of the absence of democracy in MSG but simply reflect symptoms of weak governance institutions and processes.

As a group, the West Papua issue will continue to test MSG’s commitment to defend and promote independence as the inalienable right of indigenous peoples of Melanesia as well as to promote their human rights.

There is strong and growing support among the MSG peoples for West Papua’s membership to MSG and West Papua’s aspirations to self-determination.

Obviously, Papua New Guinea Government’s position on this issue will very much weigh on MSG’s considerations in terms of how it deals with West Papua.

For me personally, I believe that MSG should actively make representations to Indonesia to address the human rights abuses in West Papua.  MSG must also involve West Papua in some of MSG’s cultural events, sporting activities and technical skills exchanges.

West Papua after all has a significant Melanesian community.

But – should the MSG Leaders decide on granting West Papua ‘membership’, in one form or another, it should be done only on the basis that it is a Melanesian community and not because MSG countries recognise West Papua as a sovereign independent state.

MSG already has a non-state entity as a member in FLNKS.  A not too dis-similar arrangement can be found in APEC where Taiwan and Hong Kong, regarded by many as part of China, participate as partners in development with independent sovereign.  The point here is that we have to be inventive.

Again, should a decision be made for West Papua to be a ‘member’ of MSG, it is not hard to imagine this serving as a venue for both Indonesia and West Papua to dialogue and regularly brief MSG countries of developments in West Papua.

Fiji’s current political situation is another case that will continue to test MSG solidarity as a group.  It is no secret that regional decisions and approaches to Fiji have caused polarisation of views in the PIF.  Even within our MSG grouping, I can sense a tenuous unity of purpose on Fiji.  There is a real risk of a chasm developing between MSG members if we are not careful.

I have always maintained that Fiji requires our understanding and support.

Time should not be the essence for Fiji to return to elective Government.  BUT, ensuring Fiji develops a strong culture of enduring democracy, with robust democratic institutions, IS.

Melanesian values of dialogue and patience, although protracted in process, has the greatest potential to bring about the changes we want in Fiji.

This is in stark contrast to the effects that condescending tactics and heavy handed punitive actions advocated by some have had on Fiji.  I would also suggest that the changing geo-political situation in the region is a result of this.

MSG must also resist the temptation of using high “moral ground” reasons to justify calls for it to criticise Fiji’s slow return to parliamentary democracy. Although pious principles are noble they are very often void of reality on the ground.  MSG needs to be pragmatic in its approach to Fiji.

With regards to the issue of Nuclear Testing, MSG will need to continue to be interested in the transhipment through our waters of nuclear weapons and nuclear waste material.

We must be vigilant over the mechanisms established to compensate coastal states in the event of disasters.  Even with all the advances made in technology, disasters will happen and we need to ensure provision of assistance is predictable, swift and adequate under these mechanisms.

The interest shown and the entry by non-traditional powers in our region will inevitably reconfigure the geo-political landscape and usher in new security challenges.

But the notion of security extends beyond the realms of external physical threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Globalisation has given birth to new security issues.

The resulting better communications, easier movement across national borders of capital, goods, services and persons, has brought along with it challenges in cybercrime, money laundering, illicit cross-border trade, human trafficking, health, etc.

Lack of food, absence of proper sanitation, inadequate housing and un-employment are security threats in themselves.

Another security issue concerns our porous borders.

Lack of national capacity to undertake effective surveillance, means that our rich marine and land resources may be exploited in ways that are unsustainable.  Even if they are developed within the legal limits there is no guarantee that fish-catch data, forest-harvest figures and mineral-export statistics reveal the true picture, thus denying us optimum benefits from our resources.

These sets of challenges, I have just described, require us to address them collectively as MSG and as a region.  They know no borders.

Global warming and sea level rise is posing serious, if not imminent, danger to the very survival of our people on our coastlines and the low lying islands in our region.

This threat scenario calls for MSG to commit itself, and lead the way, in undertaking sustainable development practices.

Having the largest landmass in the PIF region – 99% (excluding Australia and New Zealand) MSG countries have a moral duty to re-settle climate refugees from the other small island countries of the Pacific.

Economic and Trade

Our cooperation in trade and economic activities has become somewhat the talking point of many of our colleagues in the region.  And rightly so!

It is the only regional trading agreement that is working in the Pacific.

MSG must always remind itself of the initial cynicism which accompanied the reactions of many of our regional partners when we concluded a trading agreement with only three items to trade.

The announcement generated considerable scepticism.  Some, less generous, even suggested that the idea to trade with only three items was bordering on delusional.

I only belabour this point, not to disparage our critics, but to encourage us to draw inspiration from this experience as we embark on more enhanced cooperation and greater integration.  There is nothing wrong with having a dream.  Neither is it silly to be ambitious.

MSG efforts in collective bargaining, joint provision of certain public goods and services, and general regional cooperation and integration will always attract its antagonists.

But should we allow this to determine what we can and cannot do?  I think the answer is obvious – we cannot and we must not!

MSG intra-trade continues to grow.  Currently all items traded do not attract tariff in Fiji and Vanuatu.  Papua New Guinea only has a negative list of three items and Solomon Islands is working on reducing its tariffs by 2017, a differentiated treatment granted to it by the other members because of its LDC status.

MSG countries trade with the outside world is also growing.  This is indication of the positive growth experienced by the MSG over the last few years.  There is strong indication that these growth trends will continue.

But let us not delude ourselves.  It would be naïve to think that trade liberalisation, or regional cooperation and integration, are without perils.

For the future, the challenges that MSG will need to address include diversifying our economic activities, growing the SME’s share of our economies and further developing our export capability.

We must aggressively create enabling environment for investment by providing reliable and affordable infrastructure, such as public utilities.

This might require time-bound affirmative action by our Governments to allocate resources to the development and roll-out of public goods and services to the rural areas where a large part of our populations reside.

New Caledonia, from where a member of our group comes, remains outside the MSG Trade Agreement.  This is an anomaly that requires correcting.

MSG, with a bit of innovation can extend the benefits of the Trade Agreement to the New Caledonian business community.

An idea worth considering is for Parties to the Trade Agreement to conclude a Protocol with FLNKS.  This Protocol can provide the framework for the business community in New Caledonia to benefit from the provisions of the MSG Trade Agreement.

Social and Humanitarian

MSG countries, despite their best efforts, still have data showing their social indices to be less than enviable.

Thus, improving health, education, water, sanitation, transport and communication facilities must continue to receive our serious attention.

But more importantly, MSG needs to ensure that these public goods and services are extended to reach and cover our rural populace and disadvantaged communities.

Cultural, Traditional and Sporting

The Framework Treaty on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Culture signed in 2011 is a good starting point for MSG.

The Melanesian Cup must be revived and made more permanent on the calendar of MSG.  I am happy to note that New Caledonia will host the Melanesian Cup next year.

The Melanesian Festival of Arts must continue to be a major event for MSG.  Papua New Guinea plays host to this event next year.

We must ensure that this occasion provides the opportunity for our peoples to have exchanges with a view to promoting better appreciation of the different Melanesian cultures and traditions.

The educational value of these exchanges must be exploited to the maximum by ensuring that both the young and old form part of our national delegations so that the old can impart traditional knowledge to the young.

Many of our sacred cultural properties were illegally exported and are currently being held overseas in Museums and private collections.  It would help with national efforts if MSG were to develop a common strategy to address this issue of restitution.  These sacred objects of art, in some cases human remains, need to be brought back home to rest.

Adequately resourcing our Museums and Cultural institutions to research, document, preserve and promote our cultures and traditions would ensure that our future generations continue to have a Melanesian identity.

Just as important is the need to develop appropriate curricula to teach in our schools.

Traditional institutions, such as the customary Chiefs, and customary practices, such as reconciliation ceremonies, can be better leveraged for policy dissemination and conflict resolution.

Conclusion

MSG has come a long way from its humble beginnings in Goroka.  But we certainly have not reached the ‘promised land’ that our people deserve and expect us to deliver.

The Kanaky peoples’ dream of emancipation has not been realised yet.

As we go forward, we must not forget that there are perils associated with regional cooperation, regional integration and trade liberalisation.

We must therefore recommit ourselves to the goals and objectives set by our leaders.  There is need to redouble our efforts towards greater cooperation and integration within our national boundaries, between ourselves and with our brothers in our region.

MSG cooperation and integration has been successful because there are willing partners determined to share resources, best practices and, in certain instances, prepared to extend differentiated treatment to one another in recognition of their peculiar development needs.

I would further propose that the bigger and more well-endowed of the MSG countries, like Papua New Guinea, must accept asymmetric responsibilities if MSG cooperation and integration is to be sustained.

Those well off in our Group must be prepared to make sacrifices, forego certain short term benefits, for the common good and the long term solidarity of MSG.

MSG must provide the leadership in advancing wider regional interests and concerns.  It must provide the building block for wider regional cooperation and economic prosperity.  Our interests are mutually reinforcing.

The willingness to extend a helping hand must continue to guide MSG’s approach to regional cooperation.  In fact, I would venture to suggest that this sense of compassion should underpin our every effort in regional cooperation and integration.

As such, MSG must, where ever possible, employ its size and strength to the service of the wider region, especially the small island states.

An MSG without the Pacific is the weaker, just as a Pacific without the MSG is the poorer.   

At all costs we must resist the temptation of being inward looking – there is so much to be gained from being inclusive.

The future of MSG is destined to be nothing but better.

We must aim to make MSG the paragon of Pacific sub-regionalism.

Together we have defied the odds and together we shall triumph.

Long live MSG and long live Kanaky peoples.

Thank you, Merci beaucoup.

All photos by Ben Bohane

The 19^th Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Leaders Summit has concluded with notable progress made since the last summit and much to look up to in terms of trade, climate change, security and art and culture. Other issues including West Papua’s application for membership in the MSG needs to go back to the drawing board for further consideration and/or investigation. See here the full MSG Leaders Summit Communique as released on June 20 2013. - MSG Leaders Communique – Retreat Final (2)

By Dan McGarry

In 1983, Andy Ayamiseba and the rest of the Black Brothers band descended from their flight to Port Vila’s Bauer Field airport, to be greeted by the entire cabinet of the newly fledged government of Vanuatu. They were, by Melanesian standards, superstars. They had come to assist Father Walter Lini’s Vanua’ku Pati in its first re-election campaign, and to pass on the message of freedom for West Papua. So began a relationship that would span a lifetime of activism, a liberation dream long deferred, and ultimately, a first glimmer of hope for political legitimacy for the West Papuan liberation movement.

The Black Brothers were already widely known and loved in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Touring PNG in the late 1970s, the band members first met Vanuatu independence figures, including Hilda Lini, Kalkot Mataskelekele and Charles Hakwa. Students at the University of Papua New Guinea at the time, they returned to Vanuatu to play key roles in Vanuatu’s move to independence.

A generation later, it’s hard to imagine the immediacy, the passion and the dynamism of the time. Kalkot Mataskelekele, who would later serve as Solicitor General and on the Supreme Court bench before becoming the republic’s 6^th president, was a young firebrand operating a pirate radio service from the bush north of the capital. Hilda Lini, sister to two prime ministers and the first woman elected to Vanuatu’s parliament, was a tireless organiser, working behind the scenes to promote what would become the Vanua’ku Pati.

In hindsight, it seems almost inevitable that the dynamism of this callow young political leadership would mesh and meld with the creative iconoclasm of the Black Brothers. But it had to wait before it reached its full fruition. In 1980 the Indonesian government expelled Ayamiseba and the other band members. Stateless, they sought shelter in the Netherlands. Hilda Lini had contacted them in 1980 during a visit to Europe, but it wasn’t until 1983 that they obtained refugee status and official residency. Finally able to travel again, their first destination was Vanuatu.

It was a triumphal entry. They were welcomed by Father Walter Lini’s government and a large crowd of adoring fans. Likewise, on their first visit to Solomon Islands, the roads were so packed that it took the group two hours to get from the airport into town. Their concert the next day was attended by 28,000 fans.

This week’s visit to Honiara will be somewhat more low-key, and yet perhaps more epochal than the original Black Brothers crusade. With funding and official support from the government of Vanuatu, independence leaders John Ondawame and Andy Ayamiseba are continuing their tour of Melanesian Spearhead Group members, soliciting support for membership in the sub-regional organisation. The West Papua National Coalition of Liberation, or WPNCL, is an amalgam of two previously divergent wings of the OPM (in English, the Organisation for Papuan Freedom) and a number of political groups advocating for West Papuan independence. Having met already with the Fijian and Vanuatu prime ministers as well as the incoming chair of the MSG and head of the FLNKS, Andy and John are hopeful that their meetings with Solomon Islands prime minister Darcy Lilo will be equally fruitful. In an interview last week, Ayamiseba explained that he had met and befriended Lilo during his sojourn in Honiara in the mid-90s.

Should Solomon Islands decide to voice its support for WPNCL membership in the MSG, most of the political hurdles will have been cleared for what might prove to be the first crack of light through the doorway of political legitimacy for the cause.

Arguably, the critical opening came weeks before, when Sir Michael Somare voiced the opinion that the MSG is not an intergovernmental organisation, but an organisation of peoples, joined by culture and geography. The statement, made during a celebration of the MSG 25^th anniversary, came as a surprise to some. In 2008, it was Somare who flatly blocked a motion to consider West Papuan membership in the MSG. (Admittedly, the motion was ill-timed and ill-prepared. Ayamiseba himself admits that his group had no prior knowledge, and were caught by surprise when it was tabled.)

Political legitimacy for West Papuan independence in the Pacific has long been subject to the vicissitudes of Melanesian politics. While Ayamiseba’s group were the darlings of the Vanua’ku Pati, and by extension the government of Vanuatu, the association came at a price. They were expelled from the country following the party’s schism in 1989, forcing Andy to seek asylum, first in Australia, then in Solomon Islands. His friendship with then-PM Mamaloni notwithstanding, efforts to further the independence movement stalled.

Progress elsewhere in the world was also stymied by realpolitik. In 1986, even nations such as Ghana, which had objected to the manner in which West Papua was brought under Indonesian rule, were less than responsive to overtures by John Ondawame, who had officially joined the independence movement’s leadership following its reunification the year before in Port Vila.

It is saddening to observe that, despite the fact that it clearly flouted international law in its annexation of the territory, no country outside of Melanesia offered significant criticism of Indonesia’s actions in West Papua.  Not, at least, until new media and the internet began to break down the wall of silence that had been erected around the territory. But even in the face of clearly documented torture, assassination and political oppression, many nations are still loth to legitimise the independence movement.

Even in Vanuatu, arguably the home of West Papuan independence, the road to freedom has been a long one, as full of pitfalls and obstacles as Port Vila’s physical thoroughfares – and sometimes, just as poorly managed. When Barak Sope became prime minister in 2000, he brought together nine members of the West Papuan leadership and brokered an accord that would finally bring all independence efforts under one roof. Later that year, his delegation to the UN General Assembly included three West Papuans, two OPM members and one from the Presidium. There, in an alarming example of fervour trumping political savvy, they met with the Cuban delegation.

For all of his energy, support and contributions to Melanesian identity, Barak Sope’s political ineptitude soon brought his government down. His failure even to produce a budget caused significant domestic turmoil, which effectively forced West Papua onto the back burner.  It wasn’t until 2003 that foreign affairs minister Serge Vohor welcomed back the Black Brothers, and facilitated the opening of the West Papuan People’s Representative Office, a front for the OPM.

Even then, international awareness and support were limited. Vanuatu continued to fumble the issue, balking at formal political support while continuing to express public sympathy and tacit approval. Elsewhere, tribal leader Benny Wenda’s escape from Indonesian custody and flight to the UK opened another front in the campaign. Indonesia did itself no favours when it abused the INTERPOL red list by listing Wenda as a criminal.

For several years, the movement seemed paralysed, unable to organise itself, beset by legal constraints and barely able to manage its own processes. Vanuatu politicians proved fickle, with VP president Edward Natapei voicing support but doing little. Ham Lini, whose personal commitment to the cause remains strong, was unwilling to expend more political capital on the effort after the 2008 MSG debacle. Sato Kilman, the next prime minister in line, wilfully ignored the advice of his own cabinet, supporting Voreqe Bainimarama’s move to allow Indonesia observer status at the organisation.

Quietly persistent, Ayamiseba and Ondawame continued their efforts. Its moral cause made clearer by stark images of torture and brutality circulated by West Papua Media and others, the leadership (under the auspices of the WPNCL) organised an international tour for Benny Wenda, whose travel restrictions were lifted following legal and media campaigns against Indonesia’s INTERPOL warrant. Even Wenda’s rebuff by the New Zealand parliament only fanned the flames of support. His invitation to speak to MPs inside Vanuatu’s parliament was the first of a series of small but significant breakthroughs. Notably, soon-to-be prime minister Moana Carcasses’ attendance at the event was the first public sign of his political break with Kilman.

A naturalised citizen of Tahitian descent, Carcasses perhaps felt the need to placate the nativist inclination common among Ni Vanuatu. Nonetheless, allowing himself to be photographed holding the Morning Star flag (a key symbol of West Papuan independence) symbolised a shift from sympathy to overt political support for the movement. In one of his first acts as prime minister, Carcasses met with Ayamiseba and Ondawame, personally assuring them of his government’s support in their MSG membership bid, and promising the creation of a West Papua desk in the department of foreign affairs.

Arriving as it did on the heels of a surprisingly warm and supportive reception by Bainimarama and other Fiji government officials, the independence movement appeared finally to be seeing the light of day. Outspoken and unambiguous support for membership from the Kanaky leadership was not nearly as surprising; they’ve formally supported independence since the 1990s. Nonetheless, with the FLNKS assuming the group chair shortly, Kanaky support could prove crucial.

At the risk of counting chickens, it seems that the only remaining piece to fall into place is Papua New Guinea. Wenda’s visit to PNG earlier this year did manage to cement some amount of popular support, but achieved few tangible political results. The tea leaves are few and hard to read, but it’s hard to imagine that Somare’s rather startling shift away from outright opposition would have been made were it to cause discomfort in the PNG political establishment.

One of the more popular songs Ayamiseba wrote for the Black Brothers is ‘Liklik Hope Tasol’, a ballad written in Tok Pisin whose title translates to ‘Little Hope At All’. Its narrator lies awake in the early morning hours, the victim of despair. Only the vision of the morning star and the first birds breaking the pre-dawn hush provide the impetus to survive another day. The song, with its clear political imagery and simplistic evocation of strength in adversity, is quite clearly autobiographical. It is, arguably, the anthem which has animated Ayamiseba’s lifelong pursuit of freedom.

Andy Ayamiseba is old now. While his encroaching frailty complements his unassuming, soft-spoken manner, it masks a dynamism and fervour that only appears after numerous conversations. Once lit, however, that spark provides a momentary glimpse of the man that was, the jazz-funk rebel, walking in his exile hand in hand with equally youthful –and equally naïve– leaders, themselves burdened with defining their respective societies.

What beggars description, though, is the determination required for Ayamiseba and his West Papuan brethren to spend their entire adult lives in pursuit of legitimacy, with only the slightest glint of light to show for that effort. May 1^st marks the 50^th anniversary of West Papua’s original declaration of independence. Barring any more political missteps or forays into ill-considered revolutionary activity, the coming year might be the one in which its political aspirations begin to be fulfilled. Says Ayamiseba, “You cannot stay blind and deaf for 50 years.”

By Jennifer Robinson

As the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) prepares to consider West Papua’s application for membership, it is important for member states to consider international law relevant to West Papua. West Papua is entitled to self-determination under international law, a right that was denied to them in 1969. Had Indonesia complied with its international obligations then, West Papua would – like Papua New Guinea – be an independent state and MSG member today. That violation of law continues – and is the source of ongoing violence and human rights abuse in the restive province. MSG member states have an opportunity to begin to right that wrong by granting West Papua membership.

Indonesia rests its claim to West Papua on the alleged exercise of Papuans’ right to self-determination through the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969. West Papuans call the vote a sham; it popularly known as the ‘Act of NO Choice’. International law experts agree, dismissing it as a “spurious exercise”,[1] amounting to a substantive betrayal of the principle of self-determination. [2]

Self-determination is a customary rule of international law that has evolved into a fundamental human right.  Legal commentators consider that it has attained the status of jus cogens, a peremptory rule of international law from which no state may derogate. As set out in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN GA Res 1514) subjugation by a foreign state “constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights”, is contrary to the UN Charter and “an impediment to world peace and cooperation.” This Declaration provided the basis for de-colonisation[3] and set out the international law applicable when Indonesia took control of West Papua.

In the early 1960s West Papua (then West New Guinea) was a Dutch colony and Non-Self Governing Territory on the path to independence. Under Article 73 of the UN Charter, the Dutch held the territory on “sacred trust” to bring West Papua to self-government, were required to report to the UN on progress towards their independence [4] – and did so between 1950 and 1961. Election for West Papua’s national parliament began on 9 January 1961 and the New Guinea Council took office on 5 April 1961, with the inauguration attended by officials from Australia, Britain, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and members of the South Pacific Commission.[5]

But Indonesia wanted West Papua and threatened to invade – so the Netherlands, (with Australia’s support, at least initially) prepared for war. To avoid conflict, Dutch Foreign Minister Luns proposed a plan under which Papuans would be guided to self-determination after UN administration: the Luns Plan. Meanwhile, concerned about what this might mean for their people, the New Guinea Council voted unanimously on a Manifesto for Independence & Self-Government, a national flag (Morning Star) and anthem (“Hai Tanahku Papua”) and state seal on 30 October 1961. The Dutch recognized the flag and anthem on 18 November 1961[6] and these ordinances came into effect on 1 December 1961. The New Guinea Council flew the Morning Star flag for the first time on 1 December 1961.

(It is for this reason, in protest against Indonesia’s illegal annexation of their territory West Papuans celebrate their independence day on 1 December each year and mark the occasion by raising the Morning Star flag. Such flag-raisings are met with arrests and violence.)

Indonesia was accepting arms from the USSR and so, due to Cold War realpolitik, the US intervened in the Netherlands-Indonesia dispute. The result was a political compromise in which West Papua’s fate was decided – but West Papuans were not consulted: the New York Agreement of 1962 (NYA).[7] This stipulated that administration of West Papua would pass to the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and to Indonesian administration in 1963. However, Indonesia, as the administering power, was required both by the agreement – and by general international law – to provide West Papuans a vote for self-determination in accordance with international practice. This meant by ‘informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage’ (GA Res 1514).

Instead, in 1969 Indonesia rounded up 1022 men who voted under threat of violence. The outcome was unanimous: integration with Indonesia. This ‘Act of NO Choice’ took place after six years of violence and intimidation[8] during which time the US Ambassador to Indonesia warned that Indonesian military operations “had stimulated fears…of intended genocide”. British diplomats admitted in private that, despite the outcome, West Papuans were overwhelmingly in favour of independence and UN officials have since admitted the process was “a whitewash”. International law experts describe it as a betrayal of the principle of self-determination.^[9]

Indonesia violated international law and West Papuans were denied the right to self-determination. But the UN – and the international community – did nothing.^[10] Concerned about what West Papua’s plight might mean for other states fighting against de-colonisation, a number of states complained to the UN – but those complaints fell on deaf ears. At the time, Melanesian states were each finding their own path towards independence, learning to come to terms with the legacy of colonialism and to integrate customary and national values into their own institutions.   Now, at 25 years old, the MSG has defined itself as an integral instrument for the expression of pan-Melanesian identity and solidarity. It is only natural and right for the MSG to now stand up for West Papua. Since Indonesia’s annexation, West Papuans have suffered all forms of human rights abuse in a situation that both Yale and Sydney Universities have said is approaching genocide.[11] Admitting West Papua to MSG membership would be a firm show of Melanesian solidarity against colonisation, demonstrate the region’s principled respect for international law and the need to end human rights abuse in West Papua.

Similar to Palestine before it, West Papua cannot take its claim to the international stage: it requires other UN member states to act. If West Papua’s Melanesian brothers and sisters in the MSG won’t help them – who will? It must start here.

Jennifer Robinson is Director of Legal Advocacy advising the Bertha Foundation and a member of International Lawyers for West Papua.

A West Papuan elder in the highlands above Freeport mine shows the two important elements that have been introduced to his lands: on the left he holds a Bible and in his right hand he holds a chunk of metallic rock symbolising the gold and copper being extracted in West Papua. Many Papuans believe their resources are being exploited with little benefit for their communities. Photo Ben Bohane / wakaphotos.com

By Jim Elmslie

The term ‘West Papua’ is generally understood to include the two Indonesian provinces of Papua and Papua Barat. When discussing the economics of West Papua I will be treating the two provinces as one entity, although certain comments relate to specific provinces. Where not otherwise stated the figures used are sourced from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, (Badan Pusat Statistics), website (www.bps.go.id). This paper focuses on statistics from 2010 to provide a comparative analysis of Indonesian, West Papuan and Papua New Guinean economic and social outcomes.

In 2010 the Gross Domestic Regional Product (GRDP) of West Papua was rupiah 114,656,188 million or US$12.616 billion[1]. The population of West Papua in the 2010 census was 3,593,803, of which slightly more than half are now non-Melanesian Indonesian settlers and their offspring. Most official statistics do not differentiate between the indigenous Melanesian and settler populations; this results in distortion due to the fact most settlers reside in urban and coastal areas while the mountainous interior is predominantly inhabited by traditional Melanesian people. Most GRDP accrues to urban (settler) residents. Overall the per capita GDRP of West Papua was US$3,510 in 2010.

This is substantially more than the average Indonesian GDP per capita of US$2,452 in 2010 for its 237.6 million people[2]. It is more than twice that of neighbouring PNG, which in 2010 had a GDP per capita of US$1,521[3]. However the indigenous Papuan people do not enjoy a higher standard of living than their counterparts in PNG: on the contrary many indicators place them in a significantly worse position. Papuans also comprise the poorest sector of Indonesian society despite having a higher regional income than the national average. Papua province has a poverty rate (rural and urban) of 30.66% in 2012, the highest in Indonesia and far above the national average of 11.66%[4]. Rural poverty was even more pronounced, being 39.39% against a national rural average of 14.70%. Papua Barat hardly fared any better at 36.33%. Clearly the West Papuan people are not receiving the benefits of a high regional income. Which begs the question: who is?

Literacy is also very poor – the worst in Indonesia. In the 15-44 years age group Papua province had an illiteracy rate of 34.83% in 2011, the latest figures available. This is against a national average of just 2.30%. The next worst province was Sulawesi Barat which had an illiteracy rate of 6.49%. The 15 plus years age group fared no better; again the worst in the nation by a huge margin which is still growing: in 2003 the illiteracy rate was 25.54 but by 2011 it had leapt up to 35.92%. This clearly indicates that the Indonesian educational system is failing the West Papuans. Without education and basic literacy individuals are doomed to entrenched poverty.

Health statistics are likewise grim. The infant mortality rate for Papua in 1999 (the most recent BPS figure) is 6.85%, seemingly not so far above the national average of 5.95%. However recent research by Stella Roos Peters, a Dutch scholar who worked in Papua Barat, reveals the terrible level of structural violence that West Papuan people suffer. Peters found that there is an enormous difference in the infant mortality rate for Melanesian babies and for non-Melanesian settler children. The infant mortality rate for settlers in the urban areas was only 3.6%, considerably below the national average, while for Papuans living in the rural areas she studied it was 18.4%, more than three times the national average[5].  This compares to an infant mortality rate in PNG in 2010 of 4.70%[6].

The comparison of a basic health statistic, like the rate of infant mortality between Melanesians living in PNG and those in Indonesian-controlled West Papua, is very stark. While PNG has serious problems in providing health services to its population, some 80% of whom live in rural and remote areas, it delivers a far better outcome that the Indonesian government just across the border, even though the GRDP per capita of West Papua is over twice that of PNG. As Stella Roos Peters notes:

These statistics indicate a vast inequality in society. The group-interviews held amongst the different groups confirmed that discrimination is anchored in society and systematically disadvantages the Papuans[7].

This paper briefly shows that while overall economic outcomes in West Papua are better than the Indonesian averages the Papuan people suffer conditions far worse that the average Indonesian, and worse even than their counterparts in PNG. They are poorer, less educated and deprived of even the most basic health services, leading to structural discrimination and further marginalisation. It is obvious that, besides a small Papuan elite in the civil service, the fruits of West Papua’s rapid economic growth are going to non-Papuans and foreign entities, including Jakarta.

Main points: 

Jim Elmslie (Ph.D. Econ. Syd. Univ.) is the co-convener of the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Sydney. His Ph.D. thesis entitled, Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism, was published by the University of Hawaii Press in 2002.

PiPP Editorial

As we approach the MSG Leaders’ Summit, it’s time to talk frankly and openly about West Papua’s future.

Melanesian leaders face a question integral to their collective identity: How and whether West Papua should be given membership in the sub-regional group.

Since its inception, PiPP has seen its role as one of assisting decision makers at all levels to find and evaluate the facts, opinions and points of view essential to good policy-making. The issue of self-determination for the indigenous peoples of West Papua is clearly a legitimate and increasingly pressing question. It’s clear as well that, as difficult -indeed intransigent- as it may appear to be, it must ultimately be addressed. Doing so may be hard, but it must be done. The MSG summit provides us with a small but significant window of opportunity to do so.

There are legitimate, potentially severe, political, economic and social implications to such a dialogue and any actions that might ensue, but they apply equally to the current lack of engagement on the topic.

Realpolitik notwithstanding, there is a prima facie case to be made that the indigenous peoples of West Papua deserve the same political and societal legitimacy that membership in the MSG provides. As the Grand Chief, Sir Michael Somare recently stated, the MSG is as much a gathering of peoples as nations. At the same time, it must be recognised that engagement between parties advocating stances at any point between full independence and the status quo of Indonesian sovereignty requires care, tact, respect and -most important of all -well-supported facts and information.

To this end, PiPP has solicited a number of pieces containing opinion and analysis, examining the historical, strategic, economic and legal ramifications of the question of West Papuan self-determination. Our purpose is not to end the conversation, but to provide us with the intellectual fodder to continue it. What we have so far is admittedly far too limited in scope. To that end, we welcome further submissions from interested and informed parties of all perspectives. Contact pipp@pacificpolicy.org if you wish to participate in this historic dialogue.