An overly ambitious two weeks in Copenhagen?
PiPP executive director Derek Brien was in Copenhagen for the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15). Here he describes a chaotic two weeks that resulted in a less than ambitious ‘non-deal’. After a heated final session, exhausted delegates passed a motion to ‘take note’ of the US-brokered Copenhagen Accord without formally adopting it. The pact did not have unanimous support, and the conference ended much as it had begun – with an enormous divide between the big and small economy countries. COP15 did succeed in highlighting the new face of climate change geopolitics. For the Pacific, it will be important to build on the momentum from the Copenhagen negotiations and keep the dialogue alive
- by Derek Brien
Everyone was calling for an ambitious deal in Copenhagen. Perhaps we overlooked just how ambitious it was going to be getting any sort of consensus agreement at what was probably the largest gathering of world leaders we have ever seen. Especially for such a divisive and complex issue as climate change. Hardly surprising really that what we got was a much diluted political statement, and not a legally binding treaty.
The 15th Conference of the Parties commenced amidst a climate of much anticipation. The Danish capital was optimistically rebadged Hopenhagen. Tens of thousands of delegates and observers from 191 countries descended on the Bella Centre, which was abuzz with a somewhat festive air of activity. It quickly became clear, however, that this was not going to be like any other conference. Despite two years of preparations, there was little common ground between the main parties, and the division between the big and small economy (and emitter) countries was glaring. Not only in terms of negotiating position, but also physical location within the conference centre. The small delegations of the Pacific huddled around computer terminals shared with media and civil society representatives, while other delegates adjourned to the luxury of country delegation offices. The EU and US had delegation ‘centres’ complete with cafes, offices and media briefing rooms. Within the US centre there were separate offices for the White House, the House of Representatives and the Senate, highlighting the role of domestic politics in these international talks.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Pacific led the charge, with Tuvalu in particular, mounting a strong case to limit temperature rise to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. They were not alone with over 100 ‘least developed’ countries across Africa, Central America, Asia, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific determined to hold the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) line on 1.5 to stay alive. According to some scientists, anything above a 1.5 degree increase would put some countries (including Kiribati, Tuvalu and Marshall Islands) under water.
The big economy countries were pushing the G20′s ‘more deliverable’ limit of 2 degrees, with UK climate secretary Ed Miliband suggesting the AOSIS position was simply not achievable, neither politically nor technically. Many rumours abounded that some big names were backing away from the 1.5 line – it seems this was more wishful thinking by those in the 2 degree camp. PNG did break ranks with the rest of the Pacific to support the position of those advocating 2 degrees. But by and large the rest of the 1.5 coalition held firm – so much so that some African and Pacific leaders were declaring publicly that to agree to anything else would be tantamount to a suicide pact.
Given the final accord was essentially drafted by the large emitters (including the United States, China, India and Brazil) it is hardly surprising that it sets a maximum of two degrees Celsius average global temperature rise, but it does state that a review by 2015 should consider limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (included in the last line). Further, the language in the text implies that 2 degrees is not a formal target (for there are no ‘targets’ in this ‘non-treaty’) but just that the Conference of the Parties ‘recognises the scientific view that’ the temperature increase should be held below this figure.
The lack of transparency of proceedings was another major concern voiced by the ‘developing country’ bloc throughout the two weeks. Many were angered by the propensity for ‘huddle groups’ to take control of key elements of discussions. This anger boiled over into the last marathon session when the hastily drafted accord was presented to the plenary (i.e. the 180 odd countries that were not included in its preparation – for a highly entertaining account of ‘how the deal was made’ have a look at this piece by the AFP’s Stephen Collinson – remember decisions under the rules of the climate conference generally require consensus from all participating countries). There was significant opposition from a number of African, Latin American and small island nations who were cut out of the accord’s drafting.
So other than a rather tepid commitment to keep global temperatures below 2 degrees, what does the Copenhagen Accord actually say?
First and foremost, it is a political agreement so there are no legal obligations on any of the signing parties. There is also no mention of ever translating the accord’s framework into a legally binding treaty (at one stage in Hopenhagen talk was that a weak deal would be firmed up into legal text by the next COP meeting in Mexico).
The draft document asks all countries to submit their own national emissions targets by 31 January 2010 to be included in the accord. Significantly, developing countries’ mitigation targets ‘will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting, and verification’ procedures. The US had argued strenuously that all countries, and China and India especially, should be subject to international monitoring of emissions targets.
The accord also recognise the ‘crucial role’ of forests and supports the ‘immediate establishment of a mechanism’ (including REDD-Plus) to provide incentives (money) to reduce deforestation and forest degradation.
Financial support for mitigation and adaption measures was another key area that was not fully resolved over the two weeks in Copenhagen. The ‘collective commitment’ (i.e. break down of contributions was not decided) by developed countries is around USD$30 billion for the period 2010 to 2012 rising to $100 billion by 2020. Allocation of the these funds will be split between mitigation and adaptation with priority given to the ‘most vulnerable’ developing countries including small island developing states. A new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund is to be established as operating entity of the UNFCC and accountable to the Conference of the Parties. The big economies had lobbied hard for any climate funds to be dispersed through established mechanisms (i.e. the World Bank).
Finally, the accord requires an assessment of its implementation to be completed by 2015, including the aforementioned consideration of limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees. But if it is too late to achieve this target now (as Mr Miliband has suggested) surely there will be no hope in six years time, especially as we have no binding targets for reducing emissions or other mitigation strategies. In fact, nothing in the accord really spells out just how the parties will keep the planet from warming another 2 degrees. Nor does it signify any resolution of the differences between the parties.
The Copenhagen meetings did provide a fascinating overview of the shifting sands of climate change geopolitics. The high profile role assumed by AOSIS (including the Pacific delegations) and the strength of the alliance in the face of tense negotiating demands from traditional development partners (some still interpret this as bullying) was impressive. The stronger alliances (which are becoming more coherent and their interests clearer) and the depth of division between the various interest groups such as AOSIS, the African group of countries, the BASIC block (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), and the G8 plus Australia and New Zealand, appears to make it more difficult for existing and emerging powers to secure the powers of veto of smaller countries.
All in all it was an unforgettable two weeks. Clearly trying to break the gridlock in the climate change debate was an overly ambitious target, especially within the UN framework of consensus decision making. I am sure the Danish hosts and UNFCC organisers regret the hype that resulted in an extraordinary turn out of world leaders, media and civil society representatives. This turn out served to highlight the ambiguous Copenhagen Accord (noted but not agreed to) as a face saving non-deal. It was supposed to be a planet saving deal.
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