Photo credit: Dan McGarry / Vanuatu Daily Post

The massive destruction caused by Cyclone Pam in March left the nation of Vanuatu traumatised. Nine months later, the physical and emotional scars remain visible, and the recovery effort crippled by a lack of funds (only ten per cent of what was required to rebuild was pledged by donors and international NGOs) and compounded by persistent El Nino weather conditions.

Evaluation after evaluation of previous disasters point to all the same issues experienced during the Pam response. The need for better coordination. The need to tailor international response plans to the local context (especially relevant for logistical exercises in a country spread over so many islands). The need to act quickly to provide water, shelter and food (especially where the needs are readily identifiable even in the absence of hard data). The need to empower (and not undermine) national systems and national actors. It seems the lessons are logged, but not learned. As we head towards the first ever World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, we in the Pacific need to engage and help reshape the global agenda to make humanitarian action fit for future crises in our region.

Vanuatu was also the scene of the region’s most enthralling political upheaval to date. In a series of landmark court cases, 14 MPs were jailed for corruption and subsequently barred from holding public office for ten years. Parliament was dissolved, and the country heads to a general election on 22 January, 2016. The bribery case showcased the independence of the judicial sector and, in a country that is fabled for big-man, patronage politics, that no one is above the law. It also underscored the deficiencies of the prevailing parliamentary electoral system. While many commented on the minority government left after the 14 were jailed, the bigger issue is the fact that the electoral system gives rise to a minority parliament. This will likely not change without substantial reforms that focus on representation, and not just legislating for stability. As the national conversation evolves around the bribery case and the need for reform, PiPP will seek to continue its non-partisan support to strengthening the social contract between political actors and their constituents through the much acclaimed MP Face to Face programme and other citizen engagement initiatives.

Vanuatu is not alone amongst Pacific countries plagued by corruption. Renowned anti-corruption advocate Sam Koim has led a charge for this to be elevated as a matter of utmost importance for regional leaders, given the ‘prevalence of corruption is the direct cause of pervasive poverty in our region’. In Koim’s home country, Papua New Guinea, the human toll of corruption is evident with 2.8 million people living in poverty, thousands of avoidable deaths, and poor service delivery. All of this is despite (or because of?) vast mineral wealth and extraordinary government spending, which is masking a looming financial crash.

Rule of law, justice, the need for strong institutions and peaceful settlements featured prominently in the new Sustainable Development Goals that were agreed by world leaders in September. The Pacific bloc was instrumental in ensuring the new goals covered issues pertinent to our region, especially climate change and oceans management. The Pacific also supported Timor-Leste as the leading proponent for a goal promoting peaceful societies and capable institutions. For the first time the global agenda recognises the indivisible interlinkages between peace and development, and the need to focus on building state capacity to deliver essential services and manage resources. (Note to donors: this is not a green light to continue failed ‘capacity building’ efforts that simply parachute in ‘technical assistants’ through revolving door aid programmes). As the world continues to reel under the weight of extremism, we need to ensure that the goal on peace is not re-cast solely as a tool in the never-ending ‘war on terror’ or as a means to legitimise the illegitimate beliefs of some that migration is a negative force, and that peace is an issue pertaining exclusively to developing countries. Let us not forget the universal pledge that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is to apply universally.

The Pacific bloc once again punched above its collective weight in international negotiations with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change reflecting the long held small-island position to keep global temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius instead of two – a half degree that has split negotiations over the past 20 years. However not everyone was gushing with praise for the Paris outcome, with concerns that the deal does not go far enough to hold countries to account or to deliver the international financing required.

While our UN diplomats and negotiators should rightly celebrate their remarkable achievements of this year, we need to remember that the new global goals and the climate agreement are meaningless without effective implementation. For the SDGs we need to remain active in the discussions that will finalise the indicators for the 17 goals and the first meeting of the High level Political Forum in July 2016, which will determine the global implementation and reporting mechanisms. While we are at it, we should step up our participation in the painfully slow moving efforts to reform the archaic institutional infrastructure of the United Nations. Regionally, we need to ensure our national development priorities are aligned but not subordinate to the global goals. In short, we need to take the reigns and not let others determine our development path. Domestic and regional institutional reform will be at the heart of that as well.

Small island states also held sway when it came to appointing the new Commonwealth Secretary General. Common sense prevailed as delegates came together at the last minute to unanimously back Dominica’s candidate, Baroness Scotland, thwarting the bid to give the position to Australia’s Alexander Downer as a ‘compromise candidate’. There is every hope Baroness Scotland, the first woman to hold the post, will revitalise the floundering intergovernmental organisation. Closer to home, the first woman appointed to lead the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Dame Meg Taylor, has made a solid start reviving the once premier regional  body.

Mirroring some of the key international discussions on poverty, peacekeeping and climate change, this year’s Melanesian School Debate showcased the depth of talent we have among our young people; our future leaders. Plans are unfolding to expand this highly successful initiative in future years, with the hope of including teams from the Melanesian territories of New Caledonia and West Papua. Sub-regional competitions for Polynesia and Micronesia are also being considered, with the view to holding an annual Pacific tournament.

PiPP too has had a tumultuous year. Our work programme was torn apart first by funding cuts, and then Cyclone Pam as staff scrambled to support various government, NGO and media relief efforts. As business returned to a semblance of normality we proudly assisted the government of Timor-Leste (and indirectly supported the Pacific) in the international negotiations on the new sustainable development agenda. Hosting this year’s Melanesian School Debate was a highlight for all involved, and our associates around the region continue to file insightful blogs on the issues that matter. All of this has been achieved with limited resources, which has resulted in us sadly farewelling a number of valued staff and scaling back activities. Whatever the outlook for us as an organisation, the explosion of critical thinking, innovation and passion, especially amongst the emerging generation of young Pacific leaders, suggests that the future for the region is bright. And that is what keeps us coming to work every day. But not for a few weeks. We are taking a short break to recover from the trials and tribulations of this year, and to get ready to tackle the challenges that 2016 throws up.

WPR: What explains Vanuatu’s historical political instability, and what impact has it had on the country’s governance and democracy?

Derek Brien: The electoral system rewards personality politics and facilitates minority representation. It also complicates party dynamics, as candidates are pitched against members of their own political grouping in open, multi-seat constituencies. Turnover is high at each election, and voters tend to judge candidates on their ability to deliver resources to their communities rather than on policy positions or political ideology. Bloc voting directed by community leaders is commonplace. Although ostensibly a secret ballot, analysis of election results by polling station enables politicians to determine which communities voted for them. Those that did not are penalised when it comes to the distribution of resources. These elements feed a vicious cycle of compounding political fragmentation and instability.

In the 2012 general election, 346 candidates from 32 political groupings contested the 52 parliamentary seats. The average number of votes to secure a seat was 832. In one constituency, the candidate was returned with just 265 votes, representing only 25 per cent of the electorate. Nationally, only 23.5 per cent of the registered voting population is represented in the current parliament.

WPR: How big a problem is corruption in Vanuatu, and what impact is the current scandal likely to have on efforts to tackle it?

Brien: With loosely aligned coalitions engaged in a continuous process of negotiation to form and hold onto power, the temptation to shift allegiances for pragmatic gain is very high. Most often the incentive is the promise of a ministerial portfolio, which enables the apportionment of resources and jobs to political supporters. The current bribery case has confirmed a widely held perception that cash transfers are also a contributing factor in the reshaping of coalition governments. Until now, political horse trading has been somewhat accepted as a consequence of the systemic defects and overwhelming demands of voters. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the current case is the fact that it was prosecuted in the first place. But now that it has, a national conversation is emerging about the inadequacies of a system that rewards just a few at the expense of the majority.

WPR: What are some of the major policy and development challenges facing Vanuatu, and how does corruption impact them?

Brien: As a young democracy emerging from the shackles of colonialism, Vanuatu is still forging its identity and building the state institutions necessary to deliver the basic services and infrastructure for the population to prosper. Many lament the impact of corruption and political instability on this process. While these factors undoubtedly slow the pace of development, they are not the sole forces conspiring against the establishment of a well-functioning nation-state. Resource limitations, divergent internal interests and competing external pressures amplify the country’s development challenges. But the current case has showcased that respect for the rule of law prevails, and that is what keeps the peace amid occasional political turmoil. Before laughing off the current situation, the international community should ask just how many established or emerging countries have managed such a demonstration that no one is above the law?

Photo credit: A proud Vanuatu voter on election day October 30 2012 – Graham Crumb, http://imagicity.com

Three years in the making, the new goals set an ambitious agenda to apply to every country over the next 15 years. Now the hard part – implementing the 17 goals and 169 targets in 193 countries.

The new agenda moves us on from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which expire at the end of the year, and which were essentially a tool to focus aid delivery. This time, every country will have to apply the new goals to their own national context. Funding the new agenda will be a mix of domestic resource allocation and new development partnerships.

For small countries it will mean prioritising, without cherry picking, goals. What that means in reality is unclear as we are all charting new territory when it comes to implementing this agenda. What we do know, and the new agenda recognises, is that development is a continuing spectrum – not something that can be achieved by merely copying the practices of others. And history tells us that imposed solutions rarely get traction – no matter how well intentioned or how deep the evidence base may be. So the fact that the new agenda is founded on country stewardship is to be celebrated.

Unlike the eight MDGs, which were conceived behind closed doors, the new agenda is the product of exhaustive intergovernmental negotiations, which included extensive consultations with civil society and business groups. Given the competing national and issue-based interests, it is unsurprising then that the list of new goals is vastly expanded from their predecessors. There were many vibrant debates among UN member states and across civil society about what should and should not be included. Not all ideological differences were settled, and perhaps for the first time the agenda was not dictated by a small group of powerful nations. In fact in some cases, it was a small group of small countries that held sway.

The Pacific bloc in the United Nations (the Pacific Small Island Developing States – PSIDS) championed a goal on oceans, and as part of the Alliance of Small Island States (which was chaired by Nauru throughout the 2014 Open Working Group) led the call for a goal to tackle climate change. For our countries, perhaps more aptly referred to as large ocean states, these two goals are essential elements of sustainable development.

Our regional neighbour, Timor-Leste, defied ardent opposition to be the primary proponent for a goal on peace, justice and strong institutions. Drawing on the reality of building a nation state from scratch, Timor-Leste’s recent experience of peace-building and state-building has demonstrated that without sustained peace there can be no sustainable development. Without capable and accountable institutions we cannot make the leap from goal setting to managing our economies to deliver the services and build the infrastructure our people need. Goal 16 on peaceful, inclusive societies is now widely viewed as being the ‘powerhouse from which all other action will flow’ and underpins the success of the whole agenda. Perhaps not surprising given the state of the world, most recently exemplified by the massive displacement and migration of people from Syria.

Our governments will be the primary custodians of this new agenda, but they cannot operate in isolation of national, regional and international partners. If we are serious about being the first generation to eradicate extreme poverty and the last to suffer the scourge of climate change, then we must hold our leaders to their national and international commitments to properly resource the implementation of this agenda. We will have to track our progress, and share our learning at home and abroad. More than ever, we need an active civil society to be actively engaged in renewed national conversations that will chart our own development pathways.

To start these conversations in the Pacific, PiPP has teamed up with RMIT University to launch a short survey that will tell you about the goals and what they seek to achieve, and give you the chance to rate the relevance of the goals and how your country is fairing against the targets. We aim to continue this survey (both online and offline) over the coming years and to periodically extract information in public reports to national governments and regional organisations. The aim is to get a broad understanding of the goals and how best to prioritise actions in our region, and to provide feedback to our policymakers and implementers on our progress.

We should be very proud of the achievements of our representatives in New York. The contributions from the PSIDS and Timor-Leste were instrumental in ensuring the transformative nature of this agenda. Not only for the inclusion of the goals on peace and institutions, oceans and climate change, but by ushering in a new era of global engagement. By showing that no matter how small and under resourced, small island countries can shape the international agenda.

Now all of us at home need to take the lead and actively shape the means of implementation. Otherwise the hard fought gains will be lost, and it will be back to business as usual – leaving others to determine our fate for us.

The 17 new sustainable development goals (SDGs) and their 169 targets are intended to provide the ‘transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path’ and in doing so ‘free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet’ by 2030.

A tall order perhaps, but the transformation has already commenced.

Firstly, the extraordinarily inclusive and collegial process that has given rise to the new agenda has re-calibrated the norms of intergovernmental negotiations. A key aspect of the discussions that have taken place over the last two years has been the many and varied voices that have not just had their say, but have been heard and have shaped the new agenda.

Timor-Leste, for example, as one of the newest members of the UN, was instrumental in securing Goal 16 on peace, justice and effective institutions. The Pacific bloc doggedly pursued the inclusion of Goal 13 on climate change and Goal 14 on the conservation and sustainable use of our oceans.

While some have argued that the breadth of the SDGs is troublesome, it is the very inclusion of development issues such as peace, oceans and climate change that makes this agenda transformative. Reaching far beyond the MDGs, the new goals and targets map a necessarily wide range of economic, social and environmental objectives. For the first time this has been done in a manner that recognises the deep interlinkages and mutually reinforcing nature of the agenda. To put it plainly, development is complex and we should not apologise for the complexity of the agenda – we should celebrate it.

The elevated level of ambition of the SDGs is further marked by their universality. Unlike the MDGS, which were a set of actions to be done by or for ‘developing countries’, the new goals will apply to every country. But that does not imply uniformity in application, as each country will need to tailor the agenda to their own national context and priorities. This will add to the complexity of measuring global success (or otherwise) against the new goals. However, it should also move us beyond the neat, but somewhat simplistic, dashboard reporting system of the MDGs. The follow up and review of the new agenda is predicated on regional peer learning rather than a global naming and shaming exercise.

The 2030 agenda for sustainable development contains a number of transformative elements to deliver a much needed paradigm shift in how we go about the business of development. Much will hinge on how it is implemented – and for that to be successful our national and regional planners and policy makers must be focusing on that as a matter of priority. We need to build on the momentum of the last two years to continue to chart our own development path. In that light, the new goals can support – and not subordinate – national and regional development plans.

The new goals and targets will be formally adopted by world leaders at a special UN summit from 25-27 September in New York, and will come into effect on 1 January 2016.

The current negotiation follows on from an extraordinarily inclusive process over the last 18 months led by the UN General Assembly’s Open Working Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals. Following a global, multi-stakeholder consultation, the OWG has proposed a set of 17 sustainable development goals and targets. The group drew inspiration from a number of sources, including the Rio+20 outcome, the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post 2015 Development Agenda, and a raft of contributions from academia, business and civil society.

In the end, however, the proposed SDGs were agreed by UN member states. That means there had to be political trade offs and compromises made. But it must be recognised that development is inherently political at the local, regional and global levels. There remains some pressure to reduce the number of goals and targets. But that would risk of omitting important issues just for the sake of easing communication.

We should be looking for more innovative means of communicating the agenda in its entirety. It can be done. The High Level Panel has done so already so through five transformative shifts, and the UN Secretary General has pointed to six essential elements for sustainable development in his recent synthesis report [pdf] of the process to date.

Within the UN system, it is evident that there is little desire to re-open what was an exhaustive and exhausting negotiation. Delegates recognise the political sensitivities of substantially altering the goals and the issues they address, which together form a comprehensive and mutually reinforcing development agenda. Add, remove or significantly change one goal, and the whole package is compromised.

The new agenda has more depth and nuance than the MDGs – and rightly so. This shouldn’t be seen as a problem. The general public will accept that any exercise that drives national, regional and global efforts toward coordinated, sustainable development is necessarily wide-ranging and complex. It will be up to governments, think tanks and other civil society stakeholders to distil the information such that citizens can to use the new agenda to hold their governments and international actors to account when undertaking development activities in their name.

There is now broad acceptance that the SDGs should be applicable to all countries. Rhetorically all the right noises are being made in this respect, although it remains unclear how this will be implemented, if it’s implemented at all. A significant divide still remains between a ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ world. Many still view this as an aid agenda, rather than a development agenda.

It will be important for all countries, regardless of their economic status, to apply the goals both internally against national development priorities and as a means of improving the global commons. Indeed, it is expected that each country will contextualise the global goals and targets to the national circumstance. While the SDGs are to be universally aspirational, clearly not every goal will be applicable nationally. For example, a goal on oceans is not directly related to the national planning of land locked countries: Nevertheless, all countries have a role to play in the protection of marine resources through multilateral decision-making.

The core of the new agenda, the implementation mechanism, has yet to be finalised. There is a pressing need to rationalise and integrate many of the parallel processes that collectively set the global framework for development. Many small island countries struggle to deal with the multitude of international agreements, policy commitments and related reporting requirements. The new agenda should seek to streamline these, and not add to the bureaucratic burden.

What we have before us is a set of new goals that are intended to finish the work left undone by the MDGs, address the main gaps and omissions of the millennial agenda, and to steer global and national development on a path to sustainability over the next fifteen years. Given the competing pressures and priorities, the current proposal, while not perfect, provides a solid basis for the final intergovernmental negotiation.

Pacific island countries especially will welcome new goals addressing climate change, oceans and marine resources, inclusive economic growth, ensuring peaceful and inclusive societies, and building capable and responsive institutions that are based on the rule of law. They will no doubt also welcome the shift in focus from quantitative measurements under the MDGs to metrics designed to improve the quality of outcomes, notably in health and education. There is definitely scope to enhance the proposed goals and cover some areas not covered –or not yet covered well enough– by refining the targets and indicators. This, along with crafting a political narrative and means of implementation, will be the focus of deliberations that will continue in New York over the next six months.

In September 2015, world leaders are expected to come together to adopt this new agenda, which is intended to be transformative. If that is to happen, then UN negotiators are going to have to continue to be bold, and resist the temptation to solely rely on the political safety of pre-agreed texts and agreements, which hardly represent a recipe for transformation. The robust exchanges in the OWG and the breadth of the outcome indicate a willingness to depart from business as usual. Never before have we had consensus around such a wide reaching agenda. So let us hope we don’t slip back into well-rehearsed policy positions as the finishing touches are put into place.

Ratu Inoke Kubuabola’s insistence that Fiji will not rejoin the Pacific Islands Forum until Australia and New Zealand reconsider their participation has provided the spark for a long overdue rethink of the makeup of the regional body. Julie Bishop deftly responded with a trip to Suva and a proposal to host regional leaders in Sydney next year to have that discussion. Both ministers have set the stage for the most important regional meeting since the founding of the Forum in 1971.

If we are to reforge the regional vision and establish the relevant architecture to secure it, then these recent events must be viewed beyond the narrow prism of ‘big brother’ versus ‘petulant island states’. Both Australia and Fiji have demonstrated a newfound maturity as they have navigated the swift re-establishment of bilateral ties since the September elections in Fiji. The Forum Secretariat is also poised to advance its approach to reform under the new stewardship of Dame Meg Taylor, armed with a fresh mandate that recasts the misguided Pacific Plan as the Framework for Pacific Regionalism.

Over the last decade, geopolitical forces have upended the status quo that typified relations between the island countries and traditional Pacific powers. At the same time, nation building in island countries has progressed, and collectively island voices have been strengthened on the international stage through the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) bloc in the UN. International interest in our region continues to grow, and with it the status of the Post Forum Dialogue with key development partners. There is also increasing engagement with sub-regional entities, most notably the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Once seen as a threat to regionalism, there is finally broad acceptance of the positive role sub-regionalism can have in strengthening regional integration.

All of this has taken place while state, regional and international institutions are under increasing pressure to reach out and listen to the voices of civil society and business. This was a key point of difference of the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), which started life as Fiji’s regional breakaway meeting while suspended from the Forum. That, and of course, the fact it was established to be island-owned and island-led organisation. The notion a forum that is solely for Pacific island countries has considerable traction, and warrants careful consideration on all sides.

Let’s not fool ourselves. The discussions ahead will be difficult, but this year has turned out to be something of a turning point for regionalism. And there is much hope if discussions progress next year ahead of the proposed meeting in Sydney.

Drawing together some of the ideas that have been floated for some time would see the Forum re-cast as a political grouping based on a core membership of island states. This would also have the benefit of reflecting the Pacific grouping on the international stage. Given the prominence of the Post Forum Dialogue there is scope to better formalise this arrangement within a restructured Forum. Given the history and depth of their relationships with the Pacific, special consideration could be given to the role Australia, New Zealand and the US would play in this revised mechanism to engage with development partners. A side consideration for these three metropolitan powers would be strengthening sub-regional ties: Australia with the Melanesian Spearhead Group, New Zealand with the Polynesian Leaders Group and the US with the Micronesian Chief Executives Summit. These regional partners could also take a leaf out of Japan’s (Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting – PALM) book and roll out the red carpet every couple of years, perhaps focusing on a sub-regional basis. Thought also needs to be given to how best to engage with the non-self-governing territories. Adopting the civil society and business engagement model of the PIDF as a sub-chapter of the Forum would avert the current situation of two competing institutions operating in parallel. The secretariat should be freed up from project implementation and technical support to focus on coordinating and building the political nexus across these arms of the Forum, the sub-regional groupings and the CROP agencies.

There is a lot more thinking to be done as we open up the conversation up to new ideas in a renewed spirit of regional solidarity and cooperation.

For our part, the Pacific Institute of Public Policy will revisit its 2010 paper, ISLAND DREAMING: A fresh look at Pacific regionalism, with a view to informing options for leaders to consider as they deliberate the future of our regional architecture and its relevance for the 21st century.

Amidst the Great Depression, Dale Carnegie penned How to Win Friends and Influence People. It was one of the first self-help books to be published, and remains the gold standard of the genre having sold more than 15 million copies since its release in 1937. Carnegie’s book conveyed a simple message: success depends on our ability to communicate, and manage personal relationships effectively. It is a message that applies equally today, as it does to any discipline dependent on human interaction.

Fast forward 80 years, and we again find the world reeling from a global financial crisis. This time policymakers are responding in a much more interconnected world, and under intense scrutiny from a better informed media and public. As governments and their populations grapple with the enormity of the current global economic and political transformation, a common tendency has been to revert to insular and protectionist thinking. In this shifting landscape, the aid sector has found itself at the forefront of increasing external examination, and internal rethinking. Aid conditionality has been replaced with a mantra of mutual responsibility and jointly achieving shared goals through partnerships. In this part of the world, the Moresby Declaration, Pacific Partnerships for Development and Cairns Compact provide the foundations for a new era of cooperation between Australia and the island nations of the Pacific. These initiatives have marked the beginning of a process of reform, which could greatly benefit development and relations between countries. They also mark a renewed interest in the inherent political dimension of development policy. After all, political relationships shape policy decision-making and the allocation of public resources.

Some people insist that we should decouple aid from politics. It is a school of thought that is divorced from reality. Government to government aid is far more complex than an altruistic form of charity. It is entangled in the unwieldy political web of both donor and recipient governments. As such, it is often steeped in controversy and misunderstanding, which may overshadow the importance that aid can play in improving the lives of many people around the world.

This think piece is premised on the belief that good policy dialogue is increasingly important to achieving results from the Australian aid program (AusAID). The recent independent review of Australian aid effectiveness4 found a comparatively well performing program that could be better. This view is generally echoed throughout the Pacific. The Australian Government has accepted all but one of the 39 recommendations of the review authors, including recasting the overarching objective of the aid program, as follows:

The fundamental objective of Australian aid is to help people overcome poverty.

We work to improve the lives of those living in conditions far below what Australians find acceptable. We focus our resources and effort on areas of national interest, and where Australia can make a real difference.

The revised objective is a proper realignment of the program in terms of helping people overcome poverty. It fails, however, to truly clarify the role of Australia’s national interest. What is missing is a frank admission of intent. We know donor governments use aid spending as a means to garner solidarity, influence policy and safeguard security. These are perfectly rational foreign policy goals and, so long as we acknowledge them, do not have to be at the expense of a fundamental aim of helping people overcome poverty.

The importance of Australia’s aid program to improve its relations with Pacific neighbours was underlined in a 2010 poll which found this to be the highest-ranking foreign policy goal after goals relating to protecting Australia’s economy, security and borders. It ranked above ‘helping countries reduce poverty’ and ‘climate change’.

Making the aid program better will be contingent on an open understanding of Australia’s involvement in policy change in the countries where it works. AusAID’s Office of Development Effectiveness has ‘identified a need for more robust, broad and frequent policy dialogue’ and found that ‘AusAID’s achievements from policy dialogue are patchy, reflecting a lack of organisational capacity or clear strategy to improve engagement’.

Seek to support, not influence

In his guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence, Harry Jones rightly notes that ‘influencing policy is a central part of much international development work’. He goes on to give the example that donor agencies ‘must engage in policy dialogue if they channel funds through budget support, to try to ensure their money is well-spent’. It is proper that donor agencies ensure accountability to their parliament and people on the effective and efficient use of resources. It is also true that all international development actors (be they donors, civil society organisations or activists) want to influence policy in some way. But wanting to influence does not mean that you will. Or necessarily should, at least directly.

The discourse on foreign aid is still haunted by issues of guilt, greed, and good intentions. Specifically, the role of donor agencies in policy change has been fraught with accusations of interference, neo-colonialism and aid conditionality. In some cases, such accusations have been warranted. In others the best of intentions have been thwarted, often due to a lack of traction for a good idea. But even the best of intentions can be misguided, especially in the Pacific where text book case studies often do not apply
even if they are based on world’s best practice. That is why critics of aid (including Bill Easterly and Dambisa Moyo) point to countries that have soaked up huge amounts of aid money with very little to show. In our region, Papua New Guinea jumps to mind. Supporters of aid (including Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz) point to a range of successful countries that have received significant aid (though none in the Pacific).

Criticism is mainly levelled at aid donors. A key constraint on donor agencies and other development actors is the need to prove to their constituents that they are being effective and ‘making a difference’. Often this is bound by unrealistic time frames. The usual period of engagement is two to three year project cycles, after which staff move on and development thinking shifts to the next big idea, often buoyed by a success story from somewhere else.

Despite the rhetoric of ‘sustainability’, promoting ‘ownership’ and ‘building capacity’ the pressure is often too great to get a quick result. Yet, rarely do imposed solutions get traction, and for good reason. We humans are a fickle lot—we generally don’t like to be told what to do, and especially don’t like to be reminded of our faults. In a region that has some of the newest nations on the planet, with the memories of independence afresh, such sentiments are particularly prevalent.

Also present is the oft-misplaced assumption that there is no capacity to deal with complex issues in country. There are technical and politically savvy Pacific islanders, most of whom are more than capable of dealing with national and regional challenges and opportunities. The issue is the pressure placed on individuals and institutions to cover off on an ever-expanding agenda of good ideas and priorities.

Policy influence has been likened to water filtering through limestone: we know the water is absorbed, but there is no knowing what route it will take or where it will come out. It is about process and patience—finding the right moment when the stars align to pursue a particular reform or initiative. We have seen that when development partners actively seek to support rather than directly influence, they actually end up doing the latter. The most significant development breakthrough in the last thirty years in the Pacific has been the reform of the telecommunications sector, and the subsequent rapid uptake of mobile telephony. It has had a profound impact on peoples’ lives— socially, economically and politically. Many agencies take the credit for the telecommunications revolutions in Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu. Rightly so, as many actors were involved—but the driving force came from within national governments. In the case of Vanuatu, AusAID’s Governance for Growth program was able to quickly respond to the government’s mood for reform and provide the support to see the monopoly broken, and the new regulatory environment put in place. That experience highlighted the benefit of patiently offering advice in the right way, to the right people, and then being poised to act once the idea takes hold.

It’s not what you say, it’s how you say it

The Pacific is a region still in the midst of defining its own identity. Despite the widely held misconception that there is a unified regional entity, the Pacific is made up of three very distinct sub-regions: Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. Within these geographical and cultural divisions are countries of vastly different social, political and economic makeups. Papua New Guinea, for example, is one of the most culturally diverse nations on the planet, with over 850 indigenous languages across a population approaching seven million. The size of the country and its economy (with total Gross Domestic Product around $15 billion) dwarfs its Pacific island neighbours. At the other end of the spectrum is Niue, with a population in the order of 1,400 people (all of whom hold New Zealand citizenship) and a total Gross Domestic Product of about $10 million. The contrast could not be starker, and yet regional thinking is often steeped in the pluralist assumption that what works in Papua New Guinea should work in Niue and vice versa.

All too often the development conversation takes place in English, a language that is not the first (or in many cases even the second) language for many people in our region, and the way it can be interpreted is culturally specific. This is especially a concern in Melanesian countries; where the widespread use of pidgin can give the same phrase in English an entirely different meaning, depending on who says it and who is hearing it. This can have serious consequences for policy dialogue in particular.

Another part of dialogue is listening and understanding—something that can be particularly difficult when the conversation is happening amongst people of different educational backgrounds. It is true anywhere that political decision makers do not necessarily have the most technical minds. That is not to say less technical people are any less intelligent, and often technical expertise can come at the cost of being able to communicate effectively—there are very few technically gifted people able to express those ideas to others. Commonly that is why good ideas seldom get used.

Getting technical information to decision makers is a fine art, one that can benefit greatly from making use of appropriate interlocutors—something that is seldom done.

Expanding our circles

How people access and use information is very much dependent on the circles in which they keep. AusAID has a particular strength in accessing world class technical and academic information, and together with other international institutions (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations agencies) publish most material on the Pacific. Despite best efforts in knowledge sharing, most reports merely collect dust on bookshelves or prop up computer screens. Many studies are duplicated over and over again. Some are good. Others are cut and paste. More often than not, reports have tended to be viewed as an end product—in itself presenting as a compelling case for change.

But information alone may not translate into action. Building the compelling case for reform from research requires grounding the literature in the live policy debate. And this is best achieved by connecting to dynamic networks—bringing together the right people, about the right things, at the right time.

At its essence, development policy is about managing change. Most people fear change, thus managing change often means managing peoples’ fear. Development partnerships may be forged between countries and institutions, but the interactions and engagement occurs through people. What are most important, especially in the Pacific, are the people-to-people relationships.

The inherent nature of an organisation like AusAID does not lend well to building relationships of the depth and understanding required to connect information to the live policy debate. It is not AusAID’s comparative advantage, but it does have the ability to tap into existing networks based within the Pacific, and that can draw on extensive local knowledge and experience. It will be those networks that will best engage and connect the principal stakeholders.

AusAID can also play another increasingly important role—bringing together other arms of government, promoting closer fraternity between Australian agencies and their counterparts in the Pacific. This could be greatly enhanced by two-way exchanges of people. Again, it is about developing relationships and exposing people to ideas and what is possible.

The exchange of people can and should be broadened beyond government. We have already witnessed the multiplier effect of the limited seasonal workers schemes—not only do participants get access to job opportunities, but they are also coming home with new ideas for how business and government can and should work. More and more the relationship between the Pacific and Australia could evolve from the current aid-centric focus to closer integration.

Providing a platform for more inclusive public debate and engagement in national and regional development matters will generate greater demand of policymakers to actively pursue development outcomes. That will generate into greater demand for information and research, and thus enhance the policy dialogue.

An overlooked arena for engagement is at the political level. Much of the governance strengthening over the past decade has neglected support for political parties. Across the region politicians are criticised for poor performance, and political parties castigated for not representing any substantial ideological positions. The underlying problem has been summarised as follows.

[T]he elites leading the independence movements reimagined their lands and islands in accordance with the maps drawn by their colonisers. The debate was not about the return to the pre-national existence of pre-colonialism, but rather the demand to take over the local institutions of colonial governance. The national revolution took place by way of this thought transfer. All at once, disparate peoples became ni-Vanuatu or Solomon Islanders or Papua New Guineans. The problem with this conceptual revolution is that it has been restricted to a small band of urban educated leaders. The majority of the people of these nations think of themselves primarily and perhaps at times exclusively in terms of their village, their island or their wantok. The nation suggested by map-makers remains a sparsely imagined construct. Little wonder that we do not see broadly based political parties emerging.

The pressure on Pacific island policymakers has never been greater, and politicians need access to information to support their role as legislators and leaders. At the same time they need to engage with their constituents, and provide tangible returns so they in turn can be re-elected. The evolution of a nuanced political dialogue will take considerable time—quite a number of election cycles—but change is inevitable.

Engaging directly in policy dialogue and through appropriate intermediaries will lead to a thorough improvement in the way we approach aid and development. It will net improved knowledge sharing, improved returns on investment, and improved research.

Aid agencies have positioned themselves as the providers of help. It is therefore very encouraging to see AusAID undergoing a process of self-help, and the current Office of Development Effectiveness policy dialogue evaluation is to be commended.

In time, with better dialogue there may ultimately be a meeting of minds on the common development expectations, and means to achieve them.

This article was produced in response to an invitation of the Office of Development Effectiveness within the Australian Government’s overseas aid program (AusAID) to inform the Evaluation of Policy Dialogue. It was first published in November 2011 by ODE, however the views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author only.