But the Pacific has never had a voice here.

Despite being UN members, no Pacific island nation has ever served on the UNSC in its 70-year history. Why is this? Is it something Pacific nations should aim for?

So far only Fiji began the process for selection, but withdrew its bid in 2011. The Solomon islands is currently exploring a bid for 2032-2033. To be a member of the UNSC you have to put your name down on the Asia Pacific Group candidature chart and so far APG countries have put their names down until 2042-2043 (Qatar). This suggests that it will be up to the next generation to decide. However if the Solomon is elected unopposed by the General Assembly then it will be a role model for other Pacific island countries to follow suit.

For decades now, there have been growing calls for reform of the UN system and in particular the UNSC. The question often asked is whether the 5 permanent members of the UNSC adequately reflect our changing times. At a time when nations like India, Brazil and Germany have become economic and political powerhouses, why are they not permanent members of the UNSC? Why is Africa, South America and the Islamic world not represented at all? Many would argue that the US, China and Russia remain the most powerful nations in the world, thus their presence is undisputed. But Britain and France?

The realpolitik view is that the current permanent members (known as the P5) would never willingly give up their seats, so the only way forward is to add to the P5, perhaps to have 9 permanent members which better reflect the many centres of power and population in today’s world. This may improve “inclusiveness” but may not make the UNSC more effective. Since each permanent member has the power of veto, which is often exercised, the idea of having a P9 with their own interests could mean even more use of the veto, thus paralyzing UN action on key issues. So far, reform in this area has been glacial and there is little room for the Pacific to wield much influence on the permanent members.

However, there is nothing stopping Pacific island countries from having a go for a non-permanent seat. But to do this requires concerted diplomat efforts and deep pockets since nations must campaign and convince others to vote for them when the seats become available. An additional problem is the way the Pacific is lumped in with Asia. Rules for membership of the UNSC state that one member from each regional block is appointed each year. According to the UN website, the Pacific is not even mentioned by name here – it is considered part of Asia:

Each year the General Assembly elects five non-permanent members (out of 10 in total) for a two-year term. In accordance with the General Assembly resolution 1991 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963, the 10 non-permanent seats are distributed on a regional basis as follows: five for African and Asian States; one for Eastern European States; two for the Latin American and Caribbean States; and two for Western European and other States.

For some time there have been calls to decouple “Pacific” from “Asia-Pacific” as they are in fact different regions and Asian countries usually dominate the process. If there was enough will, Pacific diplomats could take up this issue with the P5 members and the UN Secretary General and seek to create a distinct “Pacific” category, like Africa, which would certainly enable Pacific nations to have permanent representation. Then the only lobbying they need to do is among themselves.

Realistically, no country in the Pacific could wage a campaign on its own under the current rules. But there is nothing to stop Pacific nations from coming together to all get behind one candidate, pool resources and aim for the top. Some have suggested that the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) grouping would be the best group to help get behind such a bid.

Right now, the world is focused on climate change ahead of the Paris COP21 summit. There has never been a more urgent time for Pacific nations to have a voice at the global table to highlight their concerns and demand action to keep global temperature rise from under 2 degrees Celsius. We have eloquent leaders such as Kiribati’s President Anote Tong who have a high international profile and whose concerns for his country also reflect the concerns of all Pacific nations. Why not get all the Pacific nations behind Kiribati – or another climate-vulnerable nation – to ensure our concerns are not just heard but acted on. Climate change has become a global security issue and to have a Pacific voice at the UNSC for a one year term would give some leverage to improve the awareness of our issues and be part of a process that demands compliance to agreed resolutions.

There is frustration that financial pledges from developed countries to those most vulnerable often don’t materialize. A voice on the UNSC can add pressure to make sure climate change financing – including pledges of $100 billion by 2020 – actually happen. The key for PICs to be in the UNSC is to ensure that climate change and the special vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing States (SIDs) become an integral part of the security agenda. This is opposed to the current view of security meaning ‘boots on the ground’.

And it is not just climate change – increasingly global security issues involving war, peacekeeping operations, refugees and tax avoidance by multinationals also affect the Pacific and we have every right to have input into the way the UN decides on its course of action.

What would be involved if a Pacific nation tried to bid for a seat? What are the challenges?

To begin with, it would require most of the nations’ diplomatic resources to be devoted to UNSC work, which means less on other UN work, such as sustainable development goal (SDG) efforts. It would be a strain on capacity since the government would have to deploy their best diplomats, which may mean important bi-lateral relationships could suffer along the way.

Like many small states, our current disadvantage is that most Pacific UN missions are very small and lack depth of experience in UN matters. Furthermore most of our diplomats are politically employed and when their contracts end they are not retained by the civil service – so experience is lost.

Another factor that counts against island nations is political instability – we need our vision and policies to be stable. Regular changes of government does not allow us to strategically reposition ourselves and maintain long term stability of purpose in the UN arena.

It is fair to question whether there is any real value in bidding for a UNSC seat given the time and expense involved, and to what meaningfully could be achieved by having such a term. Yet many will recognize the need for reform within the UN system and the need for the Pacific to have a greater – and more united – voice in this global institution, and have a stake in the process of reform underway there. In terms of long term vision, PSIDs governments need to reposition themselves strategically in global affairs. This can be done.

A point to remember is that it is not only the concern of the Pacific, but more broadly the SIDS too – including Caribbean and Africa and Indian small oceans states because their development issues are very similar. This could be addressed by the current debate on UNSC reforms – advocating for SIDs non-permanent seats. After all, SIDs issues are global issues (i.e. climate change) but they need to be seen from a SIDs lens, so a seat for SIDs could help.

Australia and New Zealand have both served terms on the UNSC and invariably get the support of Pacific nations to do so. Perhaps it is time to enlist their help in backing a Pacific nation for a change. At the very least, it may be worth exploring the idea of challenging the UN to create a distinct “Pacific” region for UNSC membership so that Pacific nations would have a permanent voice there and the only lobbying they need do is among themselves.

The Pacific is being courted by all the P5 members in various ways and is mostly unaligned – that is, it is friend to all. Enlisting support from the P5 to reform the UNSC and allow for a permanent, rotating Pacific member is one strategy to get our voices heard in the most powerful room in the world.

Photo credit: UN

Thus it is also an honour to be sharing the event with Monsieur Michel Djokovic, the Ambassador of France, given how important French aid has been for this programme.

France and the Ecole Supérieure de Journalisme de Lille (ESJ) played a critically important role in helping establish the journalism degree programme at USP in 1994, with the French government funding the inaugural senior lecturer, François Turmel, and providing a substantial media resources grant to lay the foundations.

I arrived in Fiji four years later in 1998 as Head of Journalism from Papua New Guinea and what a pleasure it was working with the French Embassy on a number of journalism projects at that time, including an annual scholarship to France for journalism excellence.

These USP awards this year take place during challenging times for the media industry with fundamental questions confronting us as journalism educators about what careers we are actually educating journalists for.

When I embarked on a journalism career in the 1960s, the future was clear-cut and one tended to specialise in print, radio or television. I had a fairly heady early career being the editor at the age of 24 of an Australian national weekly newspaper, the Sunday Observer, owned by an idealistic billionaire, and we were campaigning against the Vietnam War.

Our chief foreign correspondent then was a famous journalist, Wilfred Burchett, who at the end of the Second World War 70 years ago reported on the Hiroshima nuclear bombing as a “warning to the world”.

By 1970, I was chief subeditor of the Rand Daily Mail in South Africa, the best newspaper I ever worked on and where I learned much about human rights and social justice, which has shaped my journalism and education values ever since.

I travelled overland for a year across Africa as a freelance journalist, working for agencies such as Gemini, and crossed the Sahara Desert in a Kombi van. It was critically risky even then, but doubly dangerous today.

Eventually I ended up with Agence France-Presse as an editor in Paris and worked there for several years. In fact, it was while working with AFP in Europe that I took a “back door” interest in the Pacific and that’s where my career took another trajectory when I joined the Auckland Star and became foreign news editor.

The point of me giving you some brief moments of my career in a nutshell is to stress how portable journalism was as a career in my time. But now it is a huge challenge for you young graduates going out into the marketplace.

You don’t even know whether you’re going to be called a “journalist”, or a “content provider” or a “curator” of news – or something beyond being a “news aggregator” – such is the pace of change with the digital revolution. And the loss of jobs in the media industry continues at a relentless pace.
Fortunately, in Fiji, the global industry rationalisations and pressures haven’t quite hit home locally yet. However, on the other hand you have very real immediate concerns with the Media Industry Development Decree and the “chilling’ impact that it has on the media regardless of the glossy mirage the government spin doctors like to put on it.

We had a very talented young student journalist here in Fiji a few weeks ago, Niklas Pedersen, from Denmark, on internship with local media, thanks to USP and Republika’s support. He remarked about his experience:

“I have previously tried to do stories in Denmark and New Zealand – two countries that are both in the top 10 on the RSF World Press Freedom Index, so I was a bit nervous before travelling to a country that is number 93 and doing stories there ….

“Fiji proved just as big a challenge as I had expected. The first day I reported for duty … I tried to pitch a lot of my story ideas, but almost all of them got shut down with the explanation that it was impossible to get a comment from the government on the issue.

“And therefore the story was never going to be able to get published.

“At first this stunned me, but I soon understood that it was just another challenge faced daily by Fiji journalists.”

This was a nice piece of storytelling on climate change on an issue that barely got covered in New Zealand legacy media.

Australia and New Zealand shouldn’t get too smug about media freedom in relation to Fiji, especially with Australia sliding down the world rankings over asylum seekers for example.

New Zealand also shouldn’t get carried away over its own media freedom situation. Three court cases this year demonstrate the health of the media and freedom of information in this digital era is in a bad way.

• Investigative journalist Jon Stephenson this month finally won undisclosed damages from the NZ Defence Ministry for defamation after trying to gag him over an article he wrote for Metro magazine which implicated the SAS in the US torture rendition regime in Afghanistan.

• Law professor Jane Kelsey at the University of Auckland filed a lawsuit against Trade Minister Tim Groser over secrecy about the controversial Trans Pacific Partnership (the judgment ruled the minister had disregarded the law);

• Investigative journalist Nicky Hager and author of Dirty Politics sought a judicial review after police raided his home last October, seizing documents, computers and other materials. Hager is known in the Pacific for his revelations about NZ spying on its neighbours.

Also, the New Zealand legacy media has consistently failed to report well on two of the biggest issues of our times in the Pacific – climate change and the fate of West Papua.

One of the ironies of the digital revolution is that there is an illusion of growing freedom of expression and information in the world, when in fact the reverse is true.

These are bleak times with growing numbers of journalists being murdered with impunity, from the Philippines to Somalia and Syria.

The world’s worst mass killing of journalists was the so-called Maguindanao, or Ampatuan massacre (named after the town whose dynastic family ordered the killings), when 32 journalists were brutally murdered in the Philippines in November 2009.

But increasingly savage slayings of media workers in the name of terrorism are becoming the norm, such as the outrageous attack on Charlie Hebdo cartoonists in Paris in January. Two masked gunmen assassinated 12 media workers – including five of France’s most talented cartoonists – at the satirical magazine and a responding policeman.

In early August this year, five masked jihadists armed with machetes entered the Dhaka home of a secularist blogger in Bangladesh and hacked off his head and hands while his wife was forced into a nearby room.

According to the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists in figures released this year, 506 journalists were killed in the decade between 2002 and 2012, almost double the 390 slain in the previous decade. (Both Reporters Sans Frontières and Freedom House have also reported escalating death tolls and declines in media freedom.)

(To be continued next week…)

Caption: French Ambassador Michel Djokovic (third from left), Head of USP Journalism Dr Shailendra Singh (fourth from left) and Pacific Media Centre director Professor David Robie (fifth from right) with the prizewinners at the University of the South Pacific journalism awards. Image: Lowen Sei/USP

It is geostrategic, for instance, since it points to a specific geographical location: the south Pacific in this case, to which ANZ’s specific foreign policy and relevant and commensurate resources are being directed. That can be explained by way of regionality and all its integration impetus, history, migration and resulting diasporic influences. It is geopolitical for the reason that the south Pacifics’ geographical area borders the ANZ countries. Some may even say that ANZ are geographically part of the south Pacific. As such, ‘a stable regional order’ in the area: stability in the broadest sense of security – defense and economic/financial – is critical for peace and stability. Peace and stability in the wider region forms a natural buffer for peace and stability at home. Relevant national, regional and international policies inevitably need to be formulated and resourced.

The region has experienced instability since 1971. The formation of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) in that year was an outcome of instability itself when independent Pacific island countries broke away from the SPC council to form their own forum. ANZ were invited subsequently to join the new forum. Since then the SPF, which later in 2000 became the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has had to address instability in its member states over the years, resulting in various declarations and activities such as: (i) the Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation (1997); (ii) the Biketawa Declaration (2000); (iii) the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security (2002); (iv) the RAMSI (2003); (v) the execution of Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ for refugees which is raising security concerns in PNG and Nauru; and (vi) Fiji’s case for a reconfiguration of the regional diplomacy architecture to reposition ANZ in the regional structure. There have been other security incidents in Bougainville and Timor Leste in the wider Pacific region. Furthermore, the geopolitical interests of the larger global powers in the region, and the Pacific at large, and the sensitivities and sense of vulnerability and reassessments of political alignments they bring to bear, also provide a constant backdrop to Pacific security and stability.

In the context of all this, can it be said that ‘a stable regional order’, envisioned by ANZ is being achieved? At the outset, it has to be said that a stable regional order is essentially a collective responsibility of all PIF members. For ANZ, however, it is additionally a stated geopolitical interest and as such, their individual or collective efforts aimed at this objective are inevitably subject to greater scrutiny, not only by other PIF members, but also by outside observers. Furthermore, any determination of stability or instability in the region can be realistically graduated in relative terms – relative to security situations in other parts of the world. In this context, one is likely to conclude that the unstable situations in the south Pacific region are only of minor concern by global standards. In any case, the record of PIF as regards its various declarations and other interventions over the years is indicative of the organization’s clear efforts in wanting to be in control of its security situations. ANZ can certainly take some credit for this.

Be that as it may, security continues to be a focus in the region. The history of instability that has dominated the region since inception is instructive. Furthermore, the perception of security is currently fluid – undergoing reconceptualization, as discussed here. Professor Steven Ratuva at the University of Canterbury wrote recently: “The notion of security has undergone transformation over the years as a result of the introduction of new conceptual frameworks such as human security, securitization, gendered security and subaltern security, amongst others, which seek to expand the boundaries of security beyond the traditional notion of ‘hard’ security or emphasize significant dimensions in security thinking.” As such, there is a constant need for monitoring and evaluation of security issues in order to formulate consequential policies and measures for stability to effectively prevail.

Considering all that has been said above, it can be concluded that whilst no direct blame can be directed at ANZ specifically for the instability that has characterized the region, they would necessarily be somewhat alarmed at what has happened over the years, given the efforts and resources expended in addressing the instability; and also given the fact that their best endeavors at ensuring ‘a stable regional order’ have often been frustrated.

The latter is likely to be constantly nagging the minds of the planners both in Canberra and Wellington. The most recent incident of Fiji wanting to reconfigure the regional diplomacy architecture and to reposition ANZ’s position in the regional structure is one that is loudly ringing alarm bells in both capitals. It may not force the issue onto the table where it can be passionately and forcefully debated. This is evident from the outcome of the Sydney meeting last month when the issue of the regional architecture was dropped from the meeting that had been initially convened to address the issue. However, the substance of the matter is such that due consideration should be given it; otherwise it will keep recurring in future.

Notwithstanding any procrastination for a lively discourse on the latest incident to test the region’s stability, the writer believes that this incident is imperative as an urgent prompting for ANZ to return to the drawing board and to reassess this pre-eminent geostrategic priority.

Australia does, for instance, use the opportunity of its White Paper to re-examine its geostrategic and geopolitical interests. Recently, the government of the day has had to reassess its traditional (security) alignment with the US with a balancing of its (economic) interests with China. It has also made a declaration on the significance of India and Indonesia as far as the Pacific region is concerned. I am sure that New Zealand has gone through a similar process. This, suitably, provides the backdrop to the south Pacific’s stability.

What is critical for both ANZ is a specific and analytical focus on the south Pacific region – a ‘repair and maintenance’ approach to their traditional methodology and modality of partnership, particularly on PIF, and to establish a more equal relationship, even to the point of being preferential in order to be equal; a more inclusive, a more compassionate partnership.

Caption: Australian and Fijian troops at a checkpoint during the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) operation in Bougainville in 1994. Here they screen delegates attending a peace conference to end the war on Bougainville. Photo: Ben Bohane / wakaphotos.com

The SPC-EU project states on its website that it is ‘helping Pacific Island countries to improve the governance and management of their deep-sea minerals resources in accordance with international law, with particular attention to the protection of the marine environment and securing equitable financial arrangements for Pacific island countries and their people.’

The goal is laudable. The question is, can a donor that represents countries with mining interests protect and advocate for the rights of Pacific islands? It sounds like a serious conflict of interest, much as the PACER (Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations) negotiations are, with Australian funding providing training to Forum island officials, paying for island officials to attend PACER negotiations, and financing an Office of the Chief Trade Advisor. All of this creates its own industry, a legion of trade officials who have a vested interest in promoting trade negotiations, whether or not they are, in fact, in the interests of the different island nations.

Face the facts: Deep-sea mining potentially offers a serious economic opportunity for the islands, but one that by its nature is not sustainable for the long-term and comes with possibly serious environmental consequences. In addition, experience with onshore mining is limited to a few Melanesian countries, while deep-sea mining experience and legislation is embryonic, at best.

Why keep reinventing the wheel when we have experience and examples of regional cooperation that works? The best of these are in fisheries. The Forum Fisheries Agency is a good example of a regional body that has provided solid management, monitoring and surveillance for the Pacific tuna fishery that has worked for the interests of the islands. But the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) is probably the body that is the most relevant for deep-sea mining.

Instead of going it alone, with each country establishing its own legislation and negotiating deals with mining companies individually, why not use the PNA formula that shows how rights can be managed and, through a unified effort, maximized for all parties.

What should be happening at the regional level is discussion aimed at establishing regional or sub-regional agreements so that island nations can agree to minimum terms and conditions for deep-sea mining. Drawing on the experience with the Pacific tuna fishery, the region could be working to set minimum terms and conditions that could be enacted through implementing arrangements to ensure national legislation is not undermined and small island economies are not played off against each other and exploited inequitably. This is exactly what PNA is now doing with the tuna industry.

Given that the International Seabed Authority, which was established by the United Nations to regulate these activities and develop a mining code for management and monitoring of deep-sea mining, is already reported to be issuing licenses for the Pacific, the islands need to get a better grip on what is potentially a multi-billion dollar industry, with significant side effects. Do the islands get a decent return and find ways to successfully manage environmental problems?

It seems so obvious that what is needed is a Forum Leaders declaration to address deep-sea mining at the regional level, where agreed-to regional strategies can ensure fair returns for the islands.

The ability of PNA’s eight members to maintain unity in setting minimum prices for fishing days and enforce management measures for the tuna fishery has resulted in the PNA skipjack fishery holding the highest global certification for sustainability through the Marine Stewardship Council, setting a minimum price for access to fish, controlling fishing effort, establishing compulsory satellite-based surveillance, enforcing 100 percent observer coverage of purse seiners, and implementing other requirements. Of even more relevance to deep-sea mining is PNA’s restriction limiting the transshipment of catch to export carrier vessels in designated ports, where species composition and harvest tonnage are checked and verified. This also provides significant additional direct and indirect economic benefits to the island ports. Similar transshipment requirements should apply to deep-sea mining ore carriers so independent inspectors can monitor and verify volumes and types of ores being exported.

This is unlikely to happen in the absence of a regional approach to mining. Instead of continuing down the path of individual islands negotiating their own separate deep-sea mining arrangements with all the poor governance opportunities this presents, what does the Forum region have to lose by convening a meeting with the goal of establishing a regional deep-sea mining agreement? Member countries through PNA have experience in developing successful regional agreements that establish rules and minimum standards for resource management and exploitation — to the great benefit of their members. Let’s use this experience for the benefit of all the islands in the area of deep-sea mining.

With the Forum summit in Papua New Guinea just six weeks away, this is an initiative that needs the leaders attention and action.

Photo caption: The Parties to the Nauru Agreement management of the Pacific skipjack tuna industry has resulted in a five-fold increase in revenue to its eight members since 2010.

This radical shift, however, rang alarm bells in Canberra and Wellington. According to Wesley Morgan (‘Negotiating powers: Contemporary Pacific Trade Diplomacy’): “Officials in both countries had long viewed a stable regional order in the South Pacific as a pre-eminent geostrategic priority. Australia provided funding for regional cooperation, at least in part, as a means of maintaining ‘a favourable strategic posture in the region’ (Fry 1981:480). Morgan adds: “Crucially, both countries aimed to be ‘considered by the Pacific states to be part of the region, and not part of the “outside” (ibid). If the island countries were to negotiate a trade agreement among themselves, particularly through the auspices of the SPF, this could be seen as undermining a carefully cultivated perception that they were legitimate ‘insiders’’.

In this divided scenario, ANZ pressed hard to be included in the PARTA. PICs, on the other hand, put their collective foot down to deflect the pressure from ANZ, even to the extent of rejecting an ANZ-drafted legal text. It was acknowledged at the time that what was driving ANZ was geostrategic concern rather than commercial interests; or as Myrburgh and Scollay put it in 2004: as being ‘driven by political rather than economic considerations’. This is contrasted with the PICs’ purely economic interests.

As it turned out, a compromise was struck: PARTA became PICTA for PICs only and PACER was conceived as the economic framework agreement between the two parties. PACER later gave form to PACER Plus (still under negotiation) as the FTA between ANZ and PICs. The two-tier outcome can be seen therefore as the jointly-agreed verdict whereby the PICs’ economic interests were confronted by the geostrategic (political) interests of ANZ.

Fast forward to 2015, we see a slightly different situation where the political interests of both parties are now thrust forward, and the question of ANZ’s perception of being legitimate insiders has come to the fore once again. Political interests are thus at loggerheads even though Fiji stands alone in proposing a reconfiguration of the regional architecture essentially for political reasons. Alarm bells again have been ringing for sometime especially in Canberra, again for the same political reasons that had prevailed way back in 2000.

Prima facie, it may be asked: why should ANZ bother? The PICs are not united this time around. Fiji stands in splendid isolation from the rest as the odd person out. Whilst two PIC leaders have spoken unsupportively of the Fiji’s initiative, others have not spoken one way or the other. It can also be envisaged that a majority decision can always override any recalcitrant in any case. However, the pursuit of this matter at a high level and the ardour with which it is treated is evident enough that there are considerations of prospective regional and collective risks involved in any exercise of majority decision; and the alternative of persevering towards a more acceptable resolution in the interest of regional solidarity is by far the best way to proceed.

However, to proceed as envisaged above is still without challenges. It can be seen, for instance, that purely on the strength of lack of unity on the part of the PICs, and on the precedent of 2000, it can be said that this proposition by Fiji is unlikely to see the light of day.

However, we are dealing here with weighty political issues at loggerheads, as perceived by both parties and which have great and critical implications on the coherence, utility and sustainability of the region and on regionalism. As such, the precedent arising from the PICs defiance of 2000, whilst instructive, may not necessarily be prescriptive. Being instructive merely lends itself to being an option amongst many. It follows therefore that a possible outcome from the current situation is far from certain.

One possible outcome of course is that the Fiji initiative is rejected; and the status quo prevails. That decision was not taken in the Sydney meeting last week since other issues besides the reconfiguration of the regional architecture were discussed. The decision may be taken at the PIF Leaders’ meeting in Port Moresby in early September. The decision to prolong the status quo, from the perspective of Pacific regionalism, is going to be costly for the region. That decision may indeed bring to a close Fiji’s insurgence in remapping the regional architecture. However, it will only be the beginning of further regional woes, unprecedented to some extent, to constrain our regional efforts.

For all intents and purposes, it can be envisaged that the two-tier structure, representing PICTA and PACER, which can be reflected in a new regional configuration comprising a forum for PICs only, on one hand, and another forum for PICs-ANZ, on the other hand, still presents itself as an option available. If it gets the nod, it might go some way in meeting Fiji’s requirements; and Fiji could consider completing its return to the regional grouping that has already lifted its (Fiji’s) suspension.

In any case, this option is reflective of the structure that existed way back in 1971 at the start of the SPF when two caucuses existed – the island countries caucus and that of ANZ. Professor Fry had already identified this as a possible option for the regional reconfiguration exercise in an earlier DevPolicy blog. However, this two-caucus structure only lasted a year. They both came together the following year and the single caucus has prevailed since. By way of precedents alone, this fact suggests it may be a stillborn idea. However, it should be noted that immense changes have taken place in the PICs since the early 1970s, how the region is perceived by the global community and in return, how the PICs project themselves and their issues in global arenas. Parameters for assessing and evaluating ideas and norms have undergone irreversible transition. No doubt the discourse around including Australia and New Zealand in Pacific regional architecture continues for now and may come to a head during the upcoming PIF meeting.

Caption: Foreign ministers Rimbink Pato of Papua New Guinea, Julie Bishop of Australia and Fiji’s Inoke Kubuabola during the PIF Foreign Ministers Meeting held from July 9 to 10 in Sydney, Australia. Photo by: Julie Bishop

The question posed is instructive. It reflects the mood of the negotiations now entering the ‘horse trading’ phase: negotiators begin to bargain on critical issues and resort to ‘fallback positions’ to avoid the risk of crossing ‘red lines’. It also reflects a degree of frustration about the negotiations that have become somewhat protracted. But more importantly, it reflects the stage when arguments on the basis of objective criteria are beginning to meet increasing resistance and thus requiring political solutions.

What is also instructive is the nature of the issues that are frustrating the negotiations. The issues are those that are characteristically divisive in the context of an inter-regional FTA agreement between a group of developed countries on one hand and a group of developing and least developed countries on the other. They are in fact reminiscent of the issues, for instance, under the EPA negotiations between the ACP Group and the EU and even under the multilateral trading system (MTS) where the contrasting styles and interests of diametrically opposed groups go head to head.

I raised the issues of developmental resources and labour mobility in my most recent blog ‘Who should be part of the regional architecture?’ The issues being put up for direct horse trading here are those that relate to the extent of relative protection and preferential treatment of foreign service providers vis-à-vis those of the FICs and vice-versa. The infant industry provision, for example, is “strongly opposed” by ANZ, says Maclellan. This may be so because the provision is essentially protectionist in nature. Arguments for its developmental rationale are often drowned out in a concerted push for free trade and for the removal of any discriminatory measures.

The MFN provision remains unresolved. The problem is likely to be that ANZ will want all concessions negotiated by the FICs from other regional economic communities (RECs), or with a big trading partner, to also apply to them, regardless of the membership of those RECs – whether they are developed countries or developing countries. The FICs are likely to restrict such application, again for developmental reasons.

Pre-establishment provisions which deal with the making of new investments, including the participation in existing enterprises by foreign or non-resident investors, is likely to be traded against the FICs’ “positive list’ approach: a list of sectors that can be accessed and how. Developing countries tend to be reluctant to make offers relating to pre-establishment due to their national policy to reserve some sectors for local investors for the development of domestic entrepreneurship and domestic industrialization. Developed countries on the other hand tend to demand the same national treatment accorded to domestic investors.

Division on the other unresolved issues is along this same political economy line which only highlights our differences. As a matter of fact, the ANZ stance on these issues are predictable. They reflect their WTO stances. Their commitment to the WTO principles forms the basis of their proposals for the negotiations. However, the WTO is undergoing changes. It has changed from GATT to WTO and further changes are now evident. Some have even predicted its demise – the dismal state of the Doha Development Agenda representing the ‘death of multilateralism’. Gordon Wong, a London-based researcher in international relations wrote last January of ‘The Beginning of World Trade Disorganization’. Before that Dr Jason Hickel wrote of ‘Free trade and the death of democracy’, noting the real interests at play behind the concept of free trade.

WTO is a product of the post-Cold War era when the US reigned supreme in a uni-polar world and dominated through the Washington Consensus. The WTO as an organization and its principles became a tool of that period with stronger dispute settlement provisions and the acceptance of the single undertaking provision. In contrast, the relatively weak trade regime of the GATT before that in the context of a bi-polar world at the time, had its soft provisions relating to the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) and a softer approach to preferential trade.

Now, however, with a multi-polar world and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the WTO and the MTS are undergoing further changes. Regionalism is growing. The BRICS, especially India, are threatening the powers that be in the Organization. The US’s underwriting of the Organization is coming under increasing pressure. A Beijing Consensus is on the rise.

Where is the WTO heading? Wong anticipates a way out: Capitalism with a Human Face, i.e. to transform the “social purpose” of the WTO in a return to the GATT’s ‘welfare state’ model. This comprises a compromise between laissez-faire capitalism and social welfare, genuine application of the SDTs, and greater appeal to flexibility and pragmatism in condoning protectionist behavior.

I suggest therefore that ANZ take all these changes to heart and re-visit all their proposals that are proving divisive under the PACER Plus negotiations. Why can’t they, for instance, be a lot more creative and generous as regards FICs’ proposal on ‘infant industry’ provision and negotiate offsetting measures under a ‘post-establishment’ phase under National Treatment and/or under Modes 1- 4 of service delivery under the Trade in Services agreement? Such an approach builds complementarity and maximizes value adding. Furthermore, it removes any fear of unbalanced negotiations and firmly re-enforces a win-win situation for both sides. In any case, aren’t we supposed to be essentially unitary in our approach since we belong to the same regional economic community?

His third scenario was that of doing nothing and maintaining the status quo. From his analysis of that scenario, he drew the following conclusions, viz: (i) Fiji will not resume PIF membership; (ii) Fiji will continue promotion of PIDF, PSIDS and the MSG; (iii) the region will see the entrenchment of two competing Pacific regional systems with overlapping membership; and (iv) regional unity will be hampered and scarce human and financial resources will spread thinly and inefficiently.

My blog further explores this same scenario. It subscribes to the conclusions arrived at by Professor Fry and identifies more of that ilk. All in all, this scenario will drastically set Pacific regionalism backward and all FICs will be worse off.

The stunted performance of Pacific regionalism to date is reflective of its political economy aspects. Political economy analysis of any society in general investigates how political and economic processes interact and support or impede the ability to solve development problems that require collective action.

For PIF, the relative privileged position of Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) vis-à-vis the FICs is the fundamental ingredient of the political economy of PIF and has played a major role in its conduct. ANZ are developed countries, members of the OECD that are well-resourced and affluent; they are fully integrated into the global economy. They have their own bilateral ANZCER agreement. They are signatories to the WTO and as such are determined, similar to the other big global traders, to push for free trade and the Washington Consensus. They are generally opposed to preferential trade on which the FICs still pivot their economic development strategies with the aim of integrating into the global economy. ANZ are part of Western Europe in the UN grouping of nations, whereas the FICs/PSIDS are categorized together with Asia. In geo-political and geo-strategic terms, ANZ interests vary in nuance and sensitivity vis-à-vis those of the FICs. Furthermore, ANZ are major donors and development partners to the FICs with whom they share PIF’s membership.

As developed country members of the PIF, ANZ pay the lion’s share of the PIF Secretariat budget. In addition, they often times subsidize the additional cost of regional meetings – part and parcel of regional cooperation and integration processes. Given the need to be accountable to their taxpayers, ANZ naturally seek a return on their investment. This has led them in the past to assert undue influence on management and political decisions in order to win concessions, thus breaching good governance practices and trust. The FICs, being recipients of ANZ’s ODA, have tended to turn a deaf ear to such indiscretion and not to rock the boat for fear of losing their national share of the ODA. This situation has given free rein to ANZ’s unrestrained expressions on issues. Such a scenario has proven costly for the FICs when ANZ’s undue influence had undermined FIC positions on issues of critical importance to them, for example, climate change, trade and migration.

As principal markets for FIC trade, ANZ pressed the FICs to start the negotiations on PACER Plus even though the FICs have not been able to secure any gains nor strategic advantages from the EPA and PICTA negotiations as leverage for trade talks with ANZ . Both negotiations have yet to conclude. The PACER Plus negotiations, on the other hand, appear to be faltering on two issues to which ANZ are not giving concessions. On development resources, their quantum and modality of disbursement are proving divisive. On labour mobility, ANZ are not in favour of incorporating this issue in any Free Trade Area agreement. Such incorporation would bind the two developed countries to the provisions of the agreement. Instead, they prefer to retain unilateralism in decisions on this scheme on which FICs clearly enjoy comparative advantage.

The PACER Plus is intended as a developmental agreement, like the EPA and the Doha Round before it. The ‘Plus’ sub-joinder was intended for this purpose. ANZ and FIC politicians were equally enthused on this matter. However, ANZ trade officials remain adamant about full compliance with WTO principles on trade negotiations as per Article XXIV of GATT. Their trained eyes only see the single linear pathway going forward. Flexibilities on the basis of Special and Differential Treatments and derogations from general provisions for the alternative pathways are not the language they understand. Should the PACER Plus negotiations proceed to conclusion without incorporating developmental aspects into the text of the agreement, it is clear that net gains from this agreement will accrue to ANZ and not FICs. Earlier feasibility study by Professor Wadan Narsey had reached this conclusion. In any case, any market access gained from the negotiations may be negated by the imposition of non-tariff barriers.

ANZ are keen to conclude the PACER Plus negotiations so that the agreement can replace SPARTECA, which, according to the ANZ officials, has outlived its usefulness – SPARTECA being a preferential and non-reciprocal trade agreement – an antithesis to free trade.

The various situations depicted above will tend to continue unabated under Professor Fry’s third scenario. Furthermore, the state of Pacific regionalism will be worse off without Fiji back in the fold. It can be envisaged that without Fiji’s participation in PICTA and in PACER Plus, regional trade, especially intra-FIC trade, will be missing an essential ingredient. Any possible growth, if any, in economic activities between and amongst FICs will be piecemeal and lack the needed augmentation and singularity of purpose that a united region would generate. In Fiji’s absence from PIF, the region will also lack a maverick to prick our collective consciences on occasions when we lose sight of our regional diplomatic aspirations.

There are differing views from around the region on this issue, but with the major power shifts in relation to aid and development in the region, it seems inevitable there needs to be a redefining of the geopolitical landscape that is emerging.

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is the major regional organization to which sovereign island states belong, and is the focus of a lot of the discussions. In true Pacific style, the nature of this debate may force some island states to take sides, but the issue of regionalism will not go away easily, not for some time.

When Fiji’s Foreign Minister, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola called on Tonga’s recently elected Prime Minister, Samuela ‘Akilisi Pohiva, in January, the chief interest of the discussions was to find out what was Tonga’s stance on Fiji’s call for a reconstruction of the regional architecture.

Prime Minister Pohiva told a press conference in Nuku’alofa during a visit by New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Murray McCully, that his government has not yet decided on a position regarding Fiji’s initiative for a new regional architecture that would sideline Australia and New Zealand.

However, Prime Minister Pohiva did point out then, that Tonga is not opposed to active involvement by Australia and New Zealand in the PIF.

In Nuku’alofa during Foreign Minister Bishop’s visit at the beginning of April, Prime Minister Pohiva said: “We respect Fiji’s position as they stand in accordance with their own interests, but we continue to be committed to our traditional development partners of Australia and New Zealand.”

When Fiji was suspended from the regional organization in 2006 due to the military coup led by Commodore Vorege Bainimarama, both Australia and New Zealand imposed sanctions that strained relations, forcing Fiji to look elsewhere for assistance.

The strained relationship between Fiji and the two ‘Western powers’ of the Pacific became further agitated by Fiji’s open embrace of China as a significant development partner.

Diplomatic relationship between Fiji and other Asian economic powers such as Japan, South Korea, and India became closer, and even rich Arab nations such a UAE started investing in Fiji.

A conditional demand advanced by Australia and New Zealand, backed by the United Stated, on a re-normalization of relations with Fiji depended on holding a free democratic election.

Pressures concerning timing for a democratic election that were put on Bainimarama’s interim government were largely ignored. Fiji set September 2014 as the time that would be suitable for them to hold elections, and so they did.

The political party created by Bainimarama won what was declared a fair and free election, and the Commodore was elected Prime Minister.

During the period of the marginalization of Fiji by both Australia and New Zealand, Fiji continued to grow economically despite the diplomatic roadblocks by those termed by Bainimarama as ‘old friends’.

There were also huge infrastructural developments being carried out with Chinese aid focusing on the provinces outside the main urban centers. Obviously Fiji was developing ‘new friends’ who were more active in assisting Fiji move forward in its development agenda.

But now that Fiji is back to being governed by an elected civilian government with a new constitution and a set political and economic roadmap for the future, those that had left Fiji’s side because of the 2006 coup were back beckoning for closer co-operation.

A new government was elected in Australia, and first off the block to greet and have talks with Fiji was Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. She met with Prime Minister Bainimarama and Foreign Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola. They worked out ways to ‘re-normalize’ relationships that have been cooled by hostile decisions of the previous Labour government.

New Zealand followed suit. And then the door swung open for Fiji to rejoin the Pacific Islands Forum.

This is where the problem lies, at least as far as Fiji is concerned. It has made moves to reset the regional architecture, with Australia and New Zealand playing less of a lead role in the running of PIF.

Fiji’s position, as expressed in various speeches by Prime Minister Bainimarama, is advocating they do not need the Forum for their development. In fact Fiji had also been vocal that they do not need the conditional aid from Australia and New Zealand. Partnership with their ‘new friends’ has apparently worked very well for this Pacific nation still dubbed ‘the hub of the Pacific islands.’

Fiji is proposing, at least in discussions around the region that a new organization should replace PIF, focused more on economic development, and that Australia and New Zealand should not be members.

Even before Fiji’s 2014 election, it had taken the lead in forming a new regional body, the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) which has received the support of a number of Pacific Island countries including Timor Leste, but also includes non-independent island states like American Samoa, Guam, French Polynesia, and New Caledonia.

PIDF has its secretariat in Suva.

But while Papua New Guinea, the biggest economy among Pacific island states, is supportive of the objectives of PIDF focused on economic development, it does not want to jeopardize its relationship with Australia.

PIDF restricts membership to Pacific Island states, without Australia and New Zealand.

In its inaugural meeting in 2013, Prime Minister Bainimarama declared: “We are one ocean, one people, seeking common solutions.”

In its second summit in 2014, keynote speaker, Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of Indonesia said: “The green economy is certainly essential for our resilience. It becomes a new economic paradigm which promotes economic progress without harming our riches and resources.”

The popular sentiment among Pacific nations however is that PIDF does not need to replace PIF, but can be complimentary by having a different focus, and being inclusive in its membership.

Foreign Minister Bishop made it clear that Australia will continue to play an active role in the region, but will not drive the regional agenda.

Even though she was interested in hosting a Pacific leaders meeting in Sydney, outside the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum, to discuss the regional architecture, New Zealand’s High Commissioner in Tonga said they were totally against such an idea.

He said Fiji was invited to return to PIF last year and they had no interest in discussing the regional architecture any further.

Samoa opposed the setting up of PIDF. Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi said that PIDF ‘would never replace PIF.’

Tonga’s position on this regionalism issue is that of neutrality.

PIF, the regional organization with the Secretariat also in Fiji, has for years been accused of being more or less a ‘country club’ gathering for Pacific leaders who blindly consent to Australian and New Zealand regional agendas because of aid.

But PIF’s new Secretary General, Dame Meg Taylor, while acknowledging the concerns within the region about the relevance of PIF, was very clear in her statement that the organization has an important role to play within the wider context of regionalism.

In an interview for Pacific Conversations in March, she said: “There’s a debate that the Pacific Islands Forum is becoming irrelevant, that it’s not needed. I want to be able to assure the people of the Pacific, because when they were asked… about regionalism, they responded that they needed a regional organization that represented their countries. And PIF is one that represents the independent states of the Pacific. And that’s a very precious mandate for me. And we’ve got to make sure that it is protected but also effective.”

Dame Taylor also said: “… the key emphasis is about changing the paradigm of the way development is done in the region, where the leaders of the Pacific are the ones that make the decision as to what are the regional priorities.”The Secretary General was also asked about her thoughts on the regional and sub-regional landscape as it currently stands, and how she thought it might evolve in the future particularly with opportunities offered by sub-regional organizations like the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).

She answered: “I think that what we’ve got to be open to as a regional organization is that there are some things a sub-regional can do and do them well. There are other things and issues that a regional organization has to have responsibility for and take leadership on. And to be able to exchange ideas and not to be afraid of it.”

Mr. Trotsenburg was visiting the region at the end of last month. Three solutions for his Pacific approach can be gleaned from the article. The first is that the World Bank needs to work ‘alongside global partners…to do more with Pacific island governments on unified approaches to development needs that promote a common destiny for such a vast and geographically fragmented region.’ The second is the regional approach to ‘provide the opportunities for Pacific island countries to benefit from economies of scale and shared knowledge’. The third is the ‘need to keep the momentum up and to do more, so people in Pacific island countries can see the benefits of these investments.’ The investments that Mr. Trotsenburg referred to are projects already jointly launched to help island countries mitigate impacts of climate change and adapt to the new realities they face.

The first solution rings familiar. The sentiment of course echoes the raison d’ȇtre of existing multilateral agreements, viz: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Thus, Mr. Trotsenburg’s declaration of working alongside global partners is stating the obvious. It is the commitment made under these multilateral declarations. He did say in his op-ed that the World Bank ‘has worked hard with Pacific Island countries to create an expanding partnership that has grown from a modest engagement a decade ago’. It is hoped of course that the expanding partnership is measured in increased utility and inclusive development and growth in the communities concerned and not in just dollar terms, the quantum of the loans extended.

Mr. Trotsenburg’s second point is essentially a re-enforcement of the regional approach as a means of benefitting from economies of scale and shared knowledge. But we have been doing this since 1971 and encountering intractable constraints in the process. It would have been nice to hear from the World Bank Vice President the lessons from other regional economic communities that can help Pacific regionalism overcome some of these deep-seated hurdles. How can we overcome the diseconomies of isolation, resulting from our fragmented geography, that negate our efforts at regional cooperation and even the gains from economies of scale? How can we attract especially concessionary funding for our regional projects given that the costs of regionalism in the region is naturally and peculiarly too expensive? How can we sort out the obstacles contributed by the political economy aspects of regionalism, for without a solution to these, all our collective efforts are in vain? It would have been nice to hear some pearls of wisdom.

Vice President Trotsenburg’s last point is to keep the momentum up and to do more so that Pacific island countries can see the benefits of these investments – i.e those aimed at mitigating impacts of climate change and adapting to the new realities the Pacific island countries face. This is more of a plea than a declaration of intent. It is akin to deflated optimism. For when it comes to climate change and climate change adaptations, it is evident that all our efforts in the Pacific will be nullified without the firm commitment of the major powers and global economy in reducing carbon emissions.

In a paper I had submitted to the Fiji Institute of Accountants 2014 Congress on ‘Today’s Vision: Tomorrow’s Reality: a Blue-Green Economy’, I have concluded: ‘In the absence of global commitment, this paper submits that it may only be a false sense of reality that will evolve. The paper further proffers that, in this context, and despite all our commendable efforts and noble intentions, the evidence of climate change and its associated global warming, environmental degradation, alarming poverty and escalating global disparities and resultant inequality and inequity will continue to be ‘an inconvenient truth’ that will not cease pricking the collective conscience of the global community in decades and generations to come.’

Ratu Inoke Kubuabola’s insistence that Fiji will not rejoin the Pacific Islands Forum until Australia and New Zealand reconsider their participation has provided the spark for a long overdue rethink of the makeup of the regional body. Julie Bishop deftly responded with a trip to Suva and a proposal to host regional leaders in Sydney next year to have that discussion. Both ministers have set the stage for the most important regional meeting since the founding of the Forum in 1971.

If we are to reforge the regional vision and establish the relevant architecture to secure it, then these recent events must be viewed beyond the narrow prism of ‘big brother’ versus ‘petulant island states’. Both Australia and Fiji have demonstrated a newfound maturity as they have navigated the swift re-establishment of bilateral ties since the September elections in Fiji. The Forum Secretariat is also poised to advance its approach to reform under the new stewardship of Dame Meg Taylor, armed with a fresh mandate that recasts the misguided Pacific Plan as the Framework for Pacific Regionalism.

Over the last decade, geopolitical forces have upended the status quo that typified relations between the island countries and traditional Pacific powers. At the same time, nation building in island countries has progressed, and collectively island voices have been strengthened on the international stage through the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) bloc in the UN. International interest in our region continues to grow, and with it the status of the Post Forum Dialogue with key development partners. There is also increasing engagement with sub-regional entities, most notably the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Once seen as a threat to regionalism, there is finally broad acceptance of the positive role sub-regionalism can have in strengthening regional integration.

All of this has taken place while state, regional and international institutions are under increasing pressure to reach out and listen to the voices of civil society and business. This was a key point of difference of the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), which started life as Fiji’s regional breakaway meeting while suspended from the Forum. That, and of course, the fact it was established to be island-owned and island-led organisation. The notion a forum that is solely for Pacific island countries has considerable traction, and warrants careful consideration on all sides.

Let’s not fool ourselves. The discussions ahead will be difficult, but this year has turned out to be something of a turning point for regionalism. And there is much hope if discussions progress next year ahead of the proposed meeting in Sydney.

Drawing together some of the ideas that have been floated for some time would see the Forum re-cast as a political grouping based on a core membership of island states. This would also have the benefit of reflecting the Pacific grouping on the international stage. Given the prominence of the Post Forum Dialogue there is scope to better formalise this arrangement within a restructured Forum. Given the history and depth of their relationships with the Pacific, special consideration could be given to the role Australia, New Zealand and the US would play in this revised mechanism to engage with development partners. A side consideration for these three metropolitan powers would be strengthening sub-regional ties: Australia with the Melanesian Spearhead Group, New Zealand with the Polynesian Leaders Group and the US with the Micronesian Chief Executives Summit. These regional partners could also take a leaf out of Japan’s (Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting – PALM) book and roll out the red carpet every couple of years, perhaps focusing on a sub-regional basis. Thought also needs to be given to how best to engage with the non-self-governing territories. Adopting the civil society and business engagement model of the PIDF as a sub-chapter of the Forum would avert the current situation of two competing institutions operating in parallel. The secretariat should be freed up from project implementation and technical support to focus on coordinating and building the political nexus across these arms of the Forum, the sub-regional groupings and the CROP agencies.

There is a lot more thinking to be done as we open up the conversation up to new ideas in a renewed spirit of regional solidarity and cooperation.

For our part, the Pacific Institute of Public Policy will revisit its 2010 paper, ISLAND DREAMING: A fresh look at Pacific regionalism, with a view to informing options for leaders to consider as they deliberate the future of our regional architecture and its relevance for the 21st century.