The United States Multilateral Fisheries Treaty with the Pacific Island Parties was effected in 1987. The United States government uses this multilateral agreement as the only channel to which US assistance in the form of aid is directed to the Pacific parties. In that era Pacific island states had just gained independence and this source of funding has been essential to their economy to meet public services and other state matters.

Given the access provided for by the Treaty in its early years, the United States dominates the rich fishing grounds of the Pacific islands, more specifically the Central Western Pacific waters. They enjoy enormous profits recorded in catch compared to the operational cost and the access fees paid to the Pacific islands resources owners.

The Treaty was extended twice to 2003 and later to 2013 after its initial five-year period lapsed before the re-negotiations process was done. It shows that parties see benefits from these ocean tuna resources, however the question of fairness and parity were never ever seriously considered. For the Pacific islands parties, the rationale behind the connotation of regionalism was the issue, and the conditions for equity based on resource ownership and the equation of appropriate sharing was not considered. The Treaty was therefore to the advantage of the United States, in that it established a sphere of influence which grips the region for the purpose of economic assistance in return for fishing dominance.

Therefore from analysis, the scenario we get is one that is awkward towards Pacific states when realizing that few of them which are rich in tuna resources must give up their resources to the Treaty so that other fellow sister Pacific states will also benefit from the economic assistance associated with the Treaty. Pacific Parties are therefore pad-locked with the concept of regionalism under the dictation of this multilateral arrangement.

The enforcement of the PNA Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) becomes the most outstanding leverage that balances the US monopoly in the fishing industry under the Multilateral Treaty. The eight Parties to the Nauru Agreement own more than fifty percent of global Skip Jack Tuna stock, and the other valuable Tuna species such as Big Eye and the Pacific Blue and Yellow Fin. And as the CEO of PNA Dr. Transform Aqorau once mentioned, “The PNA group is the single most influential grouping that has shaped International fisheries”. This is how we now define the new authority over resources in the PNA waters.

PNA therefore answers the issue of equity which was displaced prior to the enforcement of the VDS, however the diplomacy of the Treaty will centre much around the prospect of exerting influence on the uncertainty of regional solidarity if the Treaty was to be abolished, meaning the question of regionalism through resource management will have to be compromised without the economic assistance provided for under the multilateral arrangement. And that would be the last bargaining chip for the US towards the Pacific parties as a regional grouping. If it goes to that extent, other Pacific parties will have no choice but prepare to accept the removal of the economic assistance they have benefitted from over the past years.

Such a scenario can happen, but on the condition that it does not destabilize regional integration. If the United States prepares to unplug the Treaty, non-VDS Pacific parties must prepare to take another approach to substitute the economic assistance they receive from the Treaty. PNA members on the other hand will use its authority to determine the course of fishing activities in its rich waters, meaning the United States dominance of the fishery will fall short to an avenue where competition (among other Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) to maximize profits will go alongside sustainable fisheries that ensures win-win returns between resource owners and the industries/government of the DWFN including the United States. Fisheries can become a foreign policy not only for DWFN to Pacific islands parties but also the other way around, a situation where resource owners will no longer be spectators in the exploitation of the resources they own.

But there appears to be proper support in the pipeline in the form of long-term approaches, aimed at recovering and building more resilient forestry and fishery sectors. This article proposes some recommendations that could revive these two sectors.

A series of assessments by the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) indicate that natural forests and small-scale plantings in agro-forestry systems were all affected. Based on the Vanuatu Resource Information System (VANRIS), the total commercial volume of timber that was damaged is estimated at some 50,000 cubic meters. These commercial volumes are from high value indigenous tropical hardwood tree species.

We need to support communities with a total of 10 medium-scale saw mills that will operate to extract timber from the logs which will be used to rebuild homes, with the excess to be supplied to the local markets to create employment and income-generation activities for the local population. DARD has offered to provide trainings to assist in facilitating markets for timber.

DARD has supported tree planting for some time. Most farm trees on the island have been planted on recommendation of the DARD. One of them is the Vanuatu Sandalwood. It is a high value tree species and has been earning a profitable income for growers. Other indigenous multipurpose tree species that have been planted include the Terminalia, the Copal gum, and the Basswood Whitewood.

But, as most of the trees were planted only recently by most farmers and were only moderately wind firm, assessments ndicate that some 80% of the trees were badly damaged, and need to be replanted. The recommendation is to establish a total of 20 nurseries with the capacity of producing a total of 50,000 seedlings annually. The 20 nurseries have been targeted to produce an estimated total of 1,000,000 million seedlings for the next three years.

A total of 20 demonstration plots of Agro-forestry will be established at each nursery site for farmers and annual field days for farmers to inspect the plantings. The agriculture sector on Tanna Island is blessed with a rich volcanic soil and the sector is slowly progressing and recovering.

There has been some support in the distribution of planting materials on the island, however the potential also remains to access other traditionally selected cultivars of root crops from northern Vanuatu (which wasn’t so affected by Pam) to hasten the replanting process.

Potato planting has also generated interest from Tanna farmers in the wake of cyclone Pam. This is an indication of good progress in ownership and the determination by local farmers and communities. The recommendation is to utilise the 20 Forestry Nursery location and with the support from DARD to deploy planting materials of the selected cultivars to supply to farmers and duplicate and deploy to farmers.

A long-time serving root crop specialist, Dr Vincent Lebot, has stated that ‘Vanuatu has no food security,’ pointing out that traditional societies in the past employed clever agro-forestry farming systems, and when this was lost, Vanuatu lost its resilience to natural disasters. In Tanna, food security is a challenge, particularly in terms of access to protein. While there is available livestock, the majority of people on the island can’t afford enough protein and beef. Protein sources need to be heavily invested on to provide for the population.

A study by the Food Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on fisheries found that Vanuatu is rated as one of the lowest in the region in terms of accessing and consuming fish. A recent development in the fisheries sector is the promotion of fishpond farming of an introduced exotic species called Talapia. The only challenge with this farming technique is the availability of water, but the good news is the species does not need running water as it can easily survive in water with limited oxygen. Most farmers involved in fishpond farming for the Talapia species have been encouraged to use rainwater, as it is best for the species.

The recommendation here is to establish 10 central breeding centres for fishpond farming and to deploy some 100 fish farms so that interested farmers wanting to access the fish stock can purchase from here. The department of fisheries has conducted similar work in the northern region, which proved to be highly successful. Fishpond farming has only recently commenced on Tanna, but we hope to see the same results. Demand for protein and fish alone on Tanna is huge, so developing fishponds into a dependable sector and promoting the development of sustainable forestry will help develop local production capacity to meet post cyclone demands and ensure long-term sustainability.

The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) group are going to be the leading force pushing for ramped up rules to prevent overfishing of tuna in the region at next week’s meeting. But will they be successful in the face of a fishing industry reluctant to change?

Just as PNA-member Kiribati shocked the United States purse seine fishing industry in early October when it announced it would not provide thousands of fishing days to U.S. vessels as it had in the past, the extent to which the PNA will go to limit and in some cases reduce tuna fishing in the Pacific may surprise distant water fishing nations. What it comes down to is Pacific islands taking control of the tuna resource and forcing the industry, long controlled by distant water nations, to follow the rules laid down by the islands.

Many people in PNA are less than optimistic about the chances of getting the WCPFC to take decisive action next week in light of its inability to do so the past several years. “Looking ahead, PNA members will likely need to reassess their approach to bigeye conservation and management if our measure is not approved at WCPFC 11 in Samoa in light of the burden of bigeye conservation and management being placed on small island developing states through the current conservation and management measure,” said Dr. Transform Aqorau, CEO of the PNA, last week. His point: the PNA have already ratcheted up conservation measures in their 200-mile zones—limiting the use of fish aggregation devices, for example—but the WCPFC has not followed suit for the high seas, where most of the longliners, which target bigeye tuna, are fishing.

Pacific islands and distant water fishing nations have been put on notice by the latest regional stock assessment that catches, particularly for bigeye, a tuna coveted by the Asian, American and European sashimi market, must be capped or reduced. The scientists recommended a reduction in bigeye tuna fishing, no increase in catch levels for yellowfin tuna, and setting limits on fishing for skipjack tuna to maintain stocks at current healthy levels. But none of this is doable if the WCPFC fails to act.

The Parties to the Nauru Agreement have put a detailed plan of action on the table that aims to reel in largely out-of-control longline fishing on the high seas and to reduce the use of “fish aggregation devices” — or FADs — that lead to large catches of juvenile bigeye.

But the Fisheries Commission has failed to take decisive action in the past several annual meetings. PNA and Forum Fisheries Agency islands are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the unwillingness of distant water fishing nations to agree to needed cutbacks in fishing for bigeye, as well as limiting catches of yellowfin and skipjack tuna.

And they are showing this by turning the industry on its head. Last month, despite an historic US$90 million one-year fisheries deal reached in Honolulu, all sides say the Pacific’s long-term treaty with the United States must be redrawn. This fisheries deal sparked much media reporting and comment, especially when Kiribati announced it was going to provide only a fraction of the fishing days the U.S. fleet was seeking. Why is Kiribati not providing days to the U.S. fleet through the treaty? It’s about business.

During the most recent negotiating session between the U.S. and the 17 island nations that benefit from the U.S. treaty, the U.S. was shocked to hear Kiribati say it would offer only 300 days for U.S. vessels to use under the treaty—after providing several thousand days annually in recent years. But the U.S. shouldn’t have been surprised by this latest development. It’s been in the offing since 2010.

While leaders from the Forum island countries have said they want their fisheries officials to extend the treaty with the U.S., PNA nations are less than enthusiastic. Why? Because under the treaty, a price is locked in for U.S. access to fishing days that, in the view of PNA countries, undervalues the days. Many PNA countries don’t like being locked into providing days to the U.S. treaty—which requires 8,000 fishing days per year in PNA waters—because they can usually sell those days to other fleets for more money. While the minimum price of a fishing day in 2014 has been US$6,000, we’ve seen days sell for as high as US$13,000 because of heavy demand. In October, virtually all days for the year were sold and fishing companies were scrambling to buy or trade a few more days to continue fishing until the end of the year—a situation that puts a financial premium on days, to the benefit of the islands. But under the U.S. treaty, a price is locked in for the year: the Forum Fisheries Agency gets a management fee for administering the treaty, 15 percent is split equally among all 17 islands, and a few other deductions reduce what is left to pay the islands where U.S. purse seiners actually catch the fish.

With most of the fishing the past two years focused in Kiribati’s vast EEZ, Kiribati knows it can command a premium price because virtually all fleets want to fish in their waters. According to PNA, Kiribati’s message to the U.S. is not ‘don’t fish in our waters’. Instead, Kiribati wants to sell days bilaterally to the U.S.—outside of the treaty—as it does with other fleets so it can control the price.

Another development that has turned the industry upside down is Papua New Guinea’s National Fisheries Authority’s successful public tender of fishing days conducted last month. Although the minimum price for fishing days in 2015 is US$8,000, through the tender, PNG gained payment as high as $12,000 per day. Through the public tender, PNG restructured the number of days allocated to domestic and distant water fishing nation vessels, and addressed the ongoing problem that offloading tuna for domestic processing has not kept pace with requirements for distant water vessels or concessions provided to domestic vessels.

The tender put distant water fishing nations on notice that compliance with agreements that require vessels to land fish for processing will be enforced, pointing out that despite fishing access agreements requiring fishing boats to land 10 percent of their catches in PNG, “not one fish has ever been landed for processing.”

The actions of both Kiribati and PNG have been made possible by the PNA’s “vessel day scheme” (VDS) that allocates a certain number of fishing days for the year to each member country and establishes a minimum day price.  That price has skyrocketed with tuna revenues accruing to PNA members quadrupling, showing how the VDS has allowed PNA to shape the industry over the past five years.

In Apia, PNA faces its greatest challenge: Gaining agreement of distant water fishing nations to reduce mortality of bigeye tuna by reducing catches of longliners and most importantly, getting the Asian longline industry to provide operational catch data that for 10 years it has refused to give to the WCPFC, despite it being an obligation of membership. PNA is calling for catch levels to be cut further for nations that continue to avoid providing operational catch data—which is essential to estimating the total harvest every year and to producing accurate stock assessments.

Bigeye tuna is on the edge of an abyss, and whether it continues to be a billion dollar global industry will be determined by actions taken by islands and distant water fishing nations to reduce catches of both longliners and purse seiners. If these actions don’t come about next week in Apia, the PNA will be forced to do what it has done in the past: make rules for high seas tuna conservation that are a requirement for fishing in PNA zones.