By Ben Bohane

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s announcement of a harsh new asylum seeker policy is a gamble that he thinks will pay off for his Labor party desperate to neutralize this potent issue ahead of a looming election.

The decision to send all boat people for processing and resettlement in PNG is a huge bluff – Rudd is calculating that asylum seekers will no longer want to come to Australia now, if they know that there is no hope for resettlement and instead they will wind up permanently in PNG. It may stop the boats temporarily but is it likely to work long term?

Many observers see in this policy a political quick-fix that is not a long term solution, but it is difficult to meaningfully analyse the situation since there is still very little detail available. Rudd must know that there will be substantial protests and legal action. Courts in Australia and PNG will likely be asked to rule on whether this policy is even constitutional. The previous “Malaysian Solution” was thrown out by the Australian High Court, as was a previous attempt by Australia to deploy police to PNG some years ago by the PNG High Court.

The reality of this policy long term provokes many questions – where will these new “citizens” be resettled in a country where all land is customarily owned?  What jobs can they get? Will this cause resentment from locals angry that refugees get better treatment than themselves? Many ordinary Papuan New Guineans will become NIMBYS on this  – Not In My Backyard.

There are many who see this latest policy as another attempt by Australia to “dump” its refugee “problem” on its island neighbours, who are far from being in a position to shoulder the responsibilities given their own internal challenges. Cynics will see in this new policy not only a “quick fix” but one that Rudd knows may well be challenged and thrown out – but since the legal process will take time, this policy will buy Labor enough time leading into the election for them to claim they have “solved” the “crisis” even if the boats stop for just the next few weeks. If they win the election (against the odds) is this policy workable? How can PNG possibly accommodate the projected numbers of 30,000 refugees per year?

Australia has every right to control its borders – it is indeed the first responsibility of any government to secure its nation’s borders. It also makes sense to work towards a “regional solution”. But there has been a great deal of hysteria whipped up in Australia over numbers of arrivals and the whole issue has been “poisoned by politics” as one Labor Minister, Jason Clair, put it last week. Australia needs to take on more refugees than it has so far and its island neighbours deserve more than being the patsy for policy-on-the-run.

Dame Carol Kidu in PNG says, “it’s called the PNG Solution but I think it’s more of an Australian Solution”.

From a Pacific perspective, it is hard not to see this as another attempt by Australia to offload a domestic problem onto its neighbours. Once again Pacific leaders have taken the carrot dangling in front of them, seeing in this an opportunity for more aid, more business and more potential leverage, but they are facing a growing backlash from their own citizenry about the impact on grassroots. Given the general failure of successive PNG governments to provide adequate service delivery to its own citizens, in areas like health and education, it will be a hard sell to its own people. The majority of opinions being circulated on social media forums like PNG’s Sharp Talk are overwhelmingly negative. Much of the sentiment can be summarized in one post:

”The PNG Government has failed to provide basic rights and needs for Papua New Guinean citizens. It has turned its back on its closest neighbour and Melanesian brothers and sisters of West Papua. What makes them think they are going to prioritise making these rights for refugees over their own citizens?”

PNG Opposition leader Belden Namah told the ABC that the issue in PNG is no longer about needing money but better financial management.

But before everyone jumps to the conclusion that PNG has been “bullied” into a bad deal, consider the possible leverage this situation gives to PNG. O’Neill is a shrewd political operator, and sensing Australia’s desperation on this, the PNG government may well have done this deal on the understanding that it will give PNG more opportunity to call the shots on a range of policy areas. As Stephen Howes points out, O’Neill is already claiming credit for being the first PNG PM to get Australia to align its $500 million per year aid program more towards PNG national objectives. As PNG grows in importance due to its booming economy and strategic position, it is tempting to wonder whether Australia needs PNG now more than PNG needs Australia.

O’Neill is also gambling here. If the boats do stop then opposition within PNG is likely to be muted over time, especially as some communities like Manus see benefits. But if the boats keep coming and substantial numbers of refugees want to be resettled in PNG then O’Neill’s government will likely face a serious backlash. Domestic opposition to this is already building.

Another element for the Pacific to consider is the potential implications involved in a “regional solution”. There are already reports that the Solomon Islands have been approached to accept refugees as part of a wider resettlement plan. It means that Pacific nations, long immune to global refugee issues, will now have to start formulating their own national policy around potential refugee intakes. After decades in splendid isolation, Pacific nations will likely be called upon to become global citizens and also accept a limited number of refugees. Simply saying that “we have no capacity to accept refugees” is hard to maintain when poor countries like Pakistan and Jordan are dealing with literally millions of refugees camped on their territory.

At a time when Pacific islands are already talking about the potential for climate refugees and access themselves for resettlement, it is time for Pacific nations to realize they are being drawn into a global issue and, as global citizens, work out what are their rights and responsibilities so they have policies in place. Otherwise they risk being reactive when big regional players come calling with “urgent” new policy dilemmas they need help with.

PNG police with an Australian donated police vehicle to patrol the highlands highway in PNG. Australia has historic links with the Pacific islands individually but seems not to be engaging them on a sub-regional level via fora like the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Photo: Ben Bohane/wakaphotos.com

By Ben Bohane

FIRST it was the Pacific Century, then the Asia Pacific Century, then the Asian Century with a recent nod towards the Chinese Century. Now we are hearing of the Indo-Pacific Century. Hollywood to Bollywood, as one US military officer put it recently.

A great sweep of ocean from India to the eastern shores of California is the strategic big picture, we are told.

But while Australian policymakers debate every chess move by China, India and the US a more urgent Indo-Pacific shift, this time Indonesia versus the Pacific, is happening in two areas not even named in the Australian defence white paper 2013: West Papua and Melanesia.

This is because West Papua remains the territory that dare not speak its name in Australian policy circles. By all means talk about democracy and human rights in faraway places like Syria and Burma, where Australia has little or no influence, or closer to home, hammering Fiji with an unproductive policy.

But it appears Australians can say nothing about atrocities happening on Australia’s doorstep when Indonesia is involved. There is no way of putting this lightly: Australia continues to support Indonesian repression even as a growing body of international legal opinion labels Indonesian policy in West Papua a “slow moving genocide”. This is not trivial.

Melanesia – the region encompassing Australia’s nearest neighbours (Timor Leste, West Papua, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia) – likewise is not even referenced by name in the defence white paper.

This is a telling omission, as it reflects Australian policy to deal with these countries bilaterally while not understanding the growing dynamic of sub-regionalism and the importance of the Melanesian Spearhead Group that holds these nations and peoples together and is increasingly setting common policy for them.

Two weeks ago in Noumea, the leaders of Melanesia gathered for the 25th anniversary celebrations of the establishment of the MSG. Australia, close neighbour and supposed regional power, was not represented at this important gathering.

The summit also marked the transition of chairmanship from Fiji’s Frank Bainimarama to Victor Tutugoro, representing the Kanaky people of New Caledonia on behalf of the pro-independence FLNKS, the Kanak Socialist Front for National Liberation.

The MSG summit not only appointed a new chairman, but for the first time invited West Papuan delegates, who have applied for membership, as “special guests”. Although the decision on membership for West Papua was deferred for six months pending a planned visit to the territory by a MSG special delegation, there is now strong momentum towards membership.

This year’s official communique states that leaders “endorsed that the MSG fully supports the inalienable rights of the people of West Papua towards self-determination as provided for under the preamble of the MSG constitution” as well as “endorsed that the concerns of the MSG regarding the human rights violations and other forms of atrocities relating to the West Papuan people be raised with the government of Indonesia bilaterally and as a group”. This could prompt a crisis of sorts in Australia’s immediate region. Melanesian nations are moving away from both Australia and Indonesia, which prefer to keep the tragedy of West Papua under wraps.

Since the MSG’s establishment in 1988, Canberra has not bothered to even apply for observer status, even as countries like China, Indonesia and Luxembourg are at the table.

Perhaps it wanted to wait until Bainimarama had left the stage as MSG chair, but the MSG summit further demonstrates how Australia has become strategically adrift from its own neighbours.

It continues to view the Pacific islands as small island states in need of aid and good governance, when it is more useful to view them now as large ocean states being courted by global powers, and comprising a significant bloc of UN votes.

Island nations want their culture appreciated, their sovereignty respected, more balanced trade and for their people not to have to jump through hoops of fire to get an Australian visa.

In West Papua, the fact that Indonesia has closed off this entire territory to all foreign media and NGOs including the Red Cross shows the extent to which Indonesia wishes to hide what it is doing there. It is a clumsy gesture, symbolic of another age.

Jakarta appears not to appreciate that successive Australian governments have never supported the West Papuans and lost much political capital in the Pacific in doing so. But Indonesia must realise this position is becoming increasingly untenable as the body count piles up and Indonesia shows no sign of ever implementing meaningful autonomy or reining in its military or the jihadis there.

As a result, Indonesia’s hold over West Papua has lost its legitimacy as far as many Pacific island nations are concerned.

It is true that Indonesia has come a long way towards democracy and a free press since the fall of Suharto, but none of these progressive elements exist in West Papua, where even President SBY has no real influence over the military.

Yet the window for Indonesia to maintain control of the issue is fast closing. This is heading for the UN General Assembly, just as France is now faced with its Pacific territories like Tahiti being re-inscribed on the UN decolonisation list.

Modern multicultural Australia has forgotten the historic importance of the Pacific islands to Australia and needs its leaders to remind a new generation.

Barack Obama can declare himself a Pacific president, yet no Australian leader wants to claim our place in the region: former prime minister Julia Gillard was all about “the Asian Century”, throwing away cheaply the opportunity to be a middle-power Pacific nation in the Pacific Century.

Step back from the US-China thing for now, that will play out over decades. More pressing is that Australia needs to better balance relations with Indonesia and Melanesia.

Australia’s imperative is to embrace the Melanesian nations not as aid recipients and neighbours, but ultimately as family. It requires rhetoric, rolling out the red carpet and a new emphasis on soft-power diplomacy.

Australia will never be secure in Asia until it is secure and integrated with the island nations of the Pacific. It is time for Australian leaders to speak with vision and claim Australia’s Pacific destiny. Applying to join the MSG would be a start.

Ben Bohane is communications director for the Pacific Institute of Public Policy in Port Vila, Vanuatu.

This article appears in The Australian, Islands Business and the PACNEWS.

Attendees at the Pacific Island Round Table in Dili, Timor Leste, March 2013

By Makereta Komai, PACNEWS Editor

Fiji’s full return to all levels of Pacific ACP (African, Caribbean & Pacific) meetings on November 21 last year was ‘historical’ in many sense of the word. Historical because the decision was resolved in a truly ‘Pacific Way’ as described by Cook Islands Prime Minister Henry Puna. “The Pacific came together as a family and dealt with an important issue in a way that a family should – a Pacific Way.’

Also historic in the sense that Pacific ACP leaders created their own ‘space’ to discuss an unresolved long outstanding issue – Fiji’s full participation – without the presence of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) executives in the room. PIFS executives were in Port Moresby to assist the chair of PACP facilitate discussions. The Forum Secretariat plays a key role in the relations between Pacific ACP countries and the European Union. Apart from facilitating the meeting of PACP leaders, the Secretariat’s Secretary General is also the Regional Authorising Officer (RAO) for the European Development Fund (EDF), the development funding assistance that forms the basis of the PACP/EU relationship.

Papua New Guinea’s offer to fund and host an interim secretariat for PACP leaders – away from the Suva-based Forum Secretariat – was a significant milestone of the Port Moresby meeting. As one trade expert in the region explained to me, ‘In PACP relations with the EU, the real power lies in who controls EU development assistance to the region. Right now, that power is in the hands of PIFS Secretary General.’ After Port Moresby, Pacific ACP leaders need to determine where to locate the RAO for the Pacific region.

While that is an issue best left to PACP leaders, the first step to shift PACP responsibilities away from the Forum Secretariat is a ‘bold step,’ said the regional trade expert who is familiar with the PACP relations with the EU.

That bold step is part of the new reformed regional thinking that has emerged in the past five years or so – for Pacific Islanders and their leaders to determine what’s in their best interest without the influence or control of donors and development partners.

Rethinking Oceania

The Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) in 2010 produced paper titled ‘Rethinking Oceania’ calling for a new form of Oceanic regionalism – ‘one that is marked by politics and economics of sufficiency and solidarity.’

“The key goals in such undertaking are to strengthen family life, our traditional economies, the principles of maximizing social and political relationships and the respect and holistic perspective our Pacific people have for the environment.”

“In essence, this proposed concept is about creating the space for Oceania people to claim it as their own,” said the PCC paper.

In recent years, this new form of regionalism has begun to take hold – with the emergence of a number of sub-regional groups and breakaway of specialised and technical organisation – with almost one aim – to claim their own space to discuss issues of common interest to their members.

“These are footsteps in the sand of a region that’s growing, manifested in the growing desire to be independent from the imposed decisions from outside, according to the regional affairs expert.

The PCC proposal said the 1970’s provided the Pacific with similar leadership which gave us the ‘Pacific Way’. “Today, Oceania requires visionary and pragmatic leaders who believe that an alternative future is indeed possible for our people.”

“The coming out now is timely. The region has had 40 years to grow into maturity and we’ve made mistakes as part of that learning process. However, we now understand the value of our resources and the strength of co-operating amongst themselves. You will see more of that reassertion of independence in the coming years, said the regional expert, according to the regional affairs expert. The political reconfiguration now underway in the region coincides with global discussion on the post 2015 agenda, at the expiry of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the implementation of the Rio+20 outcomes, which can link into the new ‘reformed regional’ architecture.

Break-away, an expression of ‘enough is enough’

One only has observe current political developments in the region in the last five years or so to see the emergence of sub regional groups as an expression of the desire of Pacific countries to claim their own space to discuss their own issues.

In trade, Forum Island Countries agreed to set up a separate Office of the Chief Trade Adviser (OCTA) in Port Vila in 2009 to provide independent advice and support in the negotiations of PACER Plus negotiations with Australia and New Zealand. OCTA was created to assist island nations develop and advance their negotiating positions in PACER Plus discussions.

Similarly in 2010, the same thinking was behind the formation of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement Secretariat to allow its eight members namely Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu to take control of the management and conservation of their tuna resources for their benefit. Collectively the eight PNA countries control around 30 percent of the global tuna supply, whose estimated value of catch is over US$2 billion annually.

In New York, the formation of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), an informal group representing 11 countries at the United Nations in 2007 was an expression by these nations to work together to advance common interests in climate change, sustainable development in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, encouraging public and private sector investment and the sustainable management and conservation of marine resources.

The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), representing the four largest economies of the region established its own Secretariat in 1988 in the hope of identifying strengths within its membership to promote Melanesian identity and solidarity through political, social, trade and economic developments in the region.

On the margins of the Pacific Forum Leaders meeting in Rarotonga in August, the birth of the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) was formalised. Comprising Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, American Samoa, French Polynesia/Tahiti and Tokelau, PLG leaders amongst other things considered setting up a secretariat to co-ordinate ways to co-operate with each other at the sub- regional level. Cook Islands Prime Minister said in August the new body will not compete with other groups within the Forum. However, there are certain issues that are peculiar to Polynesia that can be dealt with at the sub-regional level.

Up north, the Micronesia Chief Executive’s Summit (MCES) has been meeting since 2003 to discuss common issues of interest to the Micronesian region. Because the islands of Micronesia are all communities that draw their economic livelihood, cultural values, spiritual well being and civic strength from their ocean-based environments, many common activities focus on environmental protection and sustainable development. The Micronesian Challenge is one of these initiatives which commit the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, Marshall Islands and

Palau to conserve 30 percent of the coastal waters and 20 percent of their forest land by 2020. These cooperative arrangements form an emerging foundation of regional cooperation and governance.

Pacific Islands Development Forum

Buried deep in the communiqué of the August meeting of the Engaging with the Pacific meeting in Fiji was a proposal to convene a meeting of the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) in 2013 to engage leaders from key sectors to implement green policies for Pacific Island Countries. It’s the first ever reference to a new body to, initially discuss issues of common interest to Pacific Island Developing States (PSIDS). The common and ‘uncontroversial issue’ to get the ball rolling for this new group is ‘green economic policies’ as agreed to in the outcomes document of the Engaging with the Pacific meeting. However, the underlying collective objective of the group is to develop into a formal body to represent ‘Pacific values and interests’ without the control of Australia and New Zealand.

Three months later, the Fijian Government formalised PIDF as a successor to its Engaging with the Pacific initiative, a meeting of Pacific nations at the invitation of the Fijian Government after its suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2009.

A cabinet statement issued on 06 November said the PIDF was seen by Pacific leaders at the Third Engaging with the Pacific in Nadi in August 2012, as an ‘opportunity for all national players in the Pacific Small Islands Development States (PSIDS) – governments, private sectors and civil society to unite in discussing and identifying options that will ensure sustainable development outcomes by establishing green PSIDS economies.’ Fiji will host the first ever PIDF Leaders summit in 2013 to demonstrate its ‘spirit of genuine interest and partnership in the overall Pacific community.’

PIDF is another example of an emerging informal group set up exclusively by Pacific leaders for their own benefit.

History repeating itself

Forty-one years ago, leaders of newly independent states from the Pacific created history when they broke ranks with the then South Pacific Commission to form the South Pacific Forum, out of frustration that political issues challenging their new democracies were not being allowed discussion at SPC meetings. This led to the formation of the South Pacific Forum (the forerunner of the Pacific Islands Forum) by Fiji, Cook Islands, Nauru, Tonga, Western Samoa including Australia and New Zealand. According to the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the two metropolitan powers were needed for their economic assistance.

30 years later in Nauru, recounting the events of 1971, Ratu Mara said he may have regretted his inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the group. Their inclusion, as he put it then, ‘was on the basis that political independence was meaningless without an economic component. However, the late Ratu Mara cautioned Forum leaders to ‘remain vigilant and take control of their destinies.’

“We found that aid had strings attached and projects were more in line with the thinking of donors than the recipients, said Ratu Mara.

The former Fijian PM and one of the founding fathers of the Forum said metropolitan powers in the Pacific imposed their solutions in an insensitive way. “When left to ourselves, we could work things out in what we call the ‘Pacific Way.

This is exactly the feeling amongst Pacific countries who have actively aligned themselves to groups of like-minded countries at sub-regional level, away from the membership of Australia and New Zealand. As highlighted above, the emergence of new configuration of Pacific interests points to a new reformed regionalism independent of Australia and New Zealand. Is it a case of history repeating itself?

Pacific Voices features opinion and analysis from commentators throughout the Pacific. PiPP encourages a wide-ranging and spirited exchange of views and welcomes submissions from all those interested in policy development. The views expressed here -and in every Pacific Voices piece- are entirely those of the author.

By: Patrick Kaiku

Earlier this year, Vanuatu hosted the 25th Anniversary of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The formal establishment of the MSG was made in 1988 through the signing of the Agreed Principles of Co-operation among Independent States of Melanesia in Port Vila, Vanuatu. The founding members of the MSG included Vanuatu, PNG, Solomon Islands and Kanaky. Fiji joined the MSG in the mid-1990s. As MSG increases its influence in the region, is it relevant to the lives of the people who inhabit countries in the Melanesian sub-region of the Pacific?

This was the question raised by Peter Forau, the Director General of the Melanesian Spearhead Group Secretariat at the Vanuatu Silver Jubilee celebrations. If anything, the MSG should not repeat the mistakes of the ambitious Pacific Plan – a blue-print for regional integration in the Pacific Island countries. The Pacific Plan was a failure from the beginning because of the rhetoric paid to strengthening Pacific cultures and languages and the out-of-touch orientations of the visions of the leaders. In the Pacific Plan, ordinary Pacific Islanders were excluded and continue to be excluded in giving meaning to the Plan.

Presently citizens of member states of the MSG have very limited appreciation of the significance of the MSG – its functions, the idea behind its creation, the values that it promotes, the benefits of its existence, and so forth. Melanesians live in the enclosed confines of their national boundaries with limited interactions amongst each other. There is less in-depth educational and experiential exchanges at the level of the citizenry.

A brief reading of the structure of the MSG and one will immediately realize that the bureaucratic and political structure of the MSG is very much elitist. There is negligible connections and involvement of the ordinary citizens in the decisions of the MSG. As long as decision making, and Melanesian initiatives remain detached from the vast majority of citizens of the MSG member states, the MSG will continue to remain irrelevant to citizens in these Melanesian countries.

Fostering people-to-people contact in the MSG

In recent decades, the Melanesian sub-region of the Pacific Islands has come to represent all that is problematic in the Pacific Islands. From the Fijian military/civilian-led coups (1987, 1999 and 2006), the decade-long civil war in Bougainville (1989-1997), the ethnic tensions in the Solomon Islands (1998-2003), the stand-off between the police and political leaders in Vanuatu during the mid-2000s and on-going law and order issues in Papua New Guinea, the problems are endless. Australian commentators have readily labeled the Melanesian sub-region as constituting the “arc of instability” comprising potential (or already) failed states.

There is a level of stigma that characterizes the Melanesian sub-region of the Pacific Islands, especially when it comes to labels that continue to misrepresent the complexities of Melanesian social and cultural societies. This is what Melanesians have to promote through greater people-to-people interaction. Exclusively relying on “military-style solutions” to address conflict or crisis situations is unsustainable and will only play into the interest of external powers. Long-term stability can be nurtured through facilitating cross-cutting relationships across Melanesian communities – where Melanesians learn from each other about their diverse societies and the challenges they collectively face as a people.

The most sustainable approach to addressing long-term issue of security in the Melanesian sub-region should be undertaken at the level of the grassroots and communities. Non-political activities that evade the sticky issues of “sovereignty” are more productive for Melanesia. Functionalism, a school of thought in international relations argues that when nations pursue non-political functional activities such as economic cooperation and development, technological advancement, the fight against illiteracy, cultural exchanges and so forth, in the long-term this lessens the potential for conflict, antagonism and instability amongst member-states.

In Melanesia, Melanesian intellectuals such as the late Bernard Narokobi, Jean Marie Tjibaou and Walter Lini have advocated the common values and layers of identity that make Melanesians a distinctive people in the world.

The Melanesian identity espoused by these great thinkers has a place in creating an awareness of the various challenges we confront in our part of the Pacific Islands. Encouraging non-political, cross-cultural exchanges programs between peoples and communities in Melanesian countries should form the objective of MSG governments. Sharing experience, expertise and learning about the diversity of our sub-region can only be afforded through increased contact and interaction by Melanesians.

Cross-border travel is inherently educational and experiential. Bounded by parochial world-views, Melanesians will not find any common ground in addressing challenges in their neighborhood. Indeed, the MSG has to be more than an economic and free trade-seeking entity.

One Pacific Island scholar argues that for regional and sub-regional organizations to succeed, “identity factors” play an integral part. Identity factors are taken to mean the “feelings of common origins and historical experiences, common elements in value systems, cultural patterns and symbolic representation”. The ultimate aim is towards building cultural identity as the foundation of the MSG member countries.

There are encouraging signs. For instance, the Melanesian Arts and Cultural Festival, which started in 1988, have successfully staged four Festivals to date. An initiative of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), it “provides an opportunity for strengthening, promoting, preserving and disseminating Melanesian arts and indigenous traditional cultures within the Melanesian region”. One would only hope that this event becomes an annual feature, instead of the 4-year interval affair that it is presently.

This should be seen as an avenue for sustained cross-border mobility and increased social-cultural exchanges. In March 2012, during the MSG Leaders’ Meeting in Fiji, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was activated when the MSG Leaders sign documents to facilitate MSG skilled labor mobility scheme. While there are economic imperatives in this MOU, the need to address cultural interactions is needed.

Likewise, there is now a visa-free arrangement for citizens of MSG member countries. Under this arrangement, Melanesians are able to travel within MSG member countries with relative ease. The reviving of the Melanesian Cup (popular in the 1980s), the renowned soccer tournament within Melanesia, should become a reality. In previous years, in the semi-professional football league in PNG, many Fijian and Solomon Island players have been recruited to play in the PNG competition. Students from Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands come to PNG for their tertiary-level qualifications. Reciprocation of short-term exchange programs in the areas of art, culture, theater and music could be feasible areas.

There are also signs that processes of community healing and rehabilitation are being replicated across Melanesia for communities that have experienced the divisiveness of conflict in the recent decades. For instance, the various factions involved in the Solomon Islands “ethnic tension” (1998-2003) and the Bougainville combatants have used the process of reconciliation to re-build their lives and find peace with each other. This example indicates a growing awareness of peace-making initiatives in the sub-region.

Presently the MSG has a permanent office and Secretariat based in Port Vila, Vanuatu. The implications become obvious: Will the MSG Secretariat and governments of the MSG countries support initiatives by Melanesians to truly participate in the realization of the objectives of “their” sub-regional organization?

Patrick Kaiku teaches in the political science strand at the University of Papua New Guinea.

This powerful statement by Timor Leste’s Finance Minister, Emilia Pires, was delivered in Monrovia, Liberia on February 11^th where 27 members of a High Level Panel met to advise on the global development framework beyond 2015—the target date for Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). While this was not specifically about the Pacific, she touched upon issues that were just as pertinent. She believes peace building and state building should be a headline goal.

I would like to thank the Liberian Government and the Liberian people for hosting this event, and in particular H.E. Madame President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.

I would also like to thank the High Level Panel Secretariat for their support in our collective efforts to discuss and deliberate the many challenges and opportunities we face in establishing a post 2015 architecture.

Let me begin by adding my support to what Ministers Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Gunilla Carlsson have just outlined in their presentations. Improving the governance of natural resource management, establishing strong, transparent and accountable institutions, and strengthening the rule of law have been the central pillars of our peace building and state building efforts in Timor-Leste.

May I be clear that what I am about to outline on peace building and state building does not apply solely to conflict and fragile countries. Although equally, we should not forget that there are 1. 5 billion people or 20% of humanity living in settings of conflict and fragility; and who are among the poorest, most vulnerable and most in need.

Whilst the MDGs give us a framework of indicators to aim for, we cannot achieve these targets if we as states do not have the tools to do so. When aid donors attempt to do it for us; it weakens any ability to establish sustainable systems of governance so that one day – we can do it alone. 
In order to build upon and accelerate the progress of the MDGs, we need in place the national building blocks for eradicating extreme poverty and bringing about sustainable development. Improving the management of natural resource revenues helps countries like ours to generate the finances to deliver the necessary services to our people. Strong institutions and a stable, peaceful environment are essential to ensure transparency and accountability in government, the private sector and civil society.

We know many countries including resource rich ones are struggling to meet the MDGs. We also know it is an undeniable truth that to reach any of these goals, eradicating extreme poverty and bringing about sustainable development, two things are required: Peace and effective state institutions.

This is what we mean by peace building and state building. Again, let me be clear, we are not talking about peacekeeping or security – both of which are the rightful domains of sovereign states, and are dealt with under the UN Security Council. I understand there has been some debate over what is actually meant when we use terms such as peace and security – to clarify, when I talk of security in this context, I am talking about safety – the safety of people.

When we talk about peace building and state building we are talking about inclusive politics, and having the necessary state apparatus to deliver basic services such as health and education, foster economic empowerment and promote sustainable development. We are talking about building and strengthening the social contract between governments and their people; so that the political and policy dialogue can include as many people as possible. This is what we mean by peace building; and it clearly benefits all countries, not just conflict affected or fragile states – indeed at times every country faces tensions and disenfranchised groups to some degree.

We are also talking about ensuring the institutions of the state can deliver services to the people. It means that we as States can manage our own resources and revenues; continue to improve service delivery, build or strengthen our institutions and enhance citizen/state confidence. If, for example, we want our children to have quality learning outcomes, and we do, then we need to ensure our education ministry has the resources and capacity to make this happen. This is what we mean by state building; and it clearly applies to all countries.

The pressures on states to deliver will only intensify as our populations become increasingly urbanised. Only the state has the apparatus to work on such large scales. NGOs and civil society have and will continue to play an important role in our development stories, but there is a vast difference, for example, between providing water tanks in individual rural communities, and providing a reliable and safe reticulated water supply and sanitation in our towns and cities.

There is no doubt in my mind that peace building and state building should be a headline goal as we set the post 2015 development agenda. It is both a precursor and a complement to the other development priorities we have been discussing across this panel, including: economic empowerment and job creation; sustainable development; improving health and education outcomes; ensuring accountability, transparency and the rule of law; and tackling inequality, especially gender inequality.

The reality for conflict affected and fragile countries in meeting any of these development goals is profound – parents will not send their children to school if they are not safe, teachers will not turn up to school if they are going to be attacked. What is the point of building the best hospitals, if our doctors and nurses can’t work out of fear of persecution?

The risk of conflict and instability is highest in new and fragile states that already experience existing stresses around water supply; agricultural productivity; poor health and education systems; few employment and business opportunities; and demographic pressures. Climate change will further exasperate these issues.

As Minister of Finance, I have experienced first hand the dual efforts of peace building and state building. When my Government came into power in 2007; over eight billion dollars had been spent by the international community since 2001. But when the 2007 Timor-Leste Standard of Living Survey came out, we discovered that poverty had doubled in some areas; and overall poverty had increased to 15%. As we only have one million people, this made us all pause for reflection. Clearly money alone does not deliver results.

Our 2007 wake up call was followed by critical and expedient reforms to, and the establishment of, vital institutions that enabled us to begin to service the population. Strong social and fiscal policies combined with peace building efforts were accelerated by initiatives to improve accountability, transparency and the rule of law. Peace came hand in hand with state building; and economic resilience quickly followed. National ownership was key to these efforts. We were empowered, where previously the State was being by-passed by donors, which was further eroding our people’s confidence in the State.

In 2010 the g7+, a group which now represents 18 countries that experience similar challenges of fragility and conflict was formed. The New Deal for engagement in fragile states identifies the key priorities for development in this context – what we have called the peace building and state building goals that cover: inclusive politics; safety for all; justice; jobs for all; and management of natural resources revenues and services.

But now we have the opportunity to grasp the learning from our experience, and the collective learning from the MDGs to broaden the scope; and universally apply these to create the enabling environment for sustained and sustainable development.

I believe we have a responsibility to make peace building and state building our headline goal. 
A goal that builds on the interlinked and mutually reinforcing principles of inclusive states, which are responsive, fair and accountable to their people. A goal that will ensure we can deliver a holistic post 2015 development agenda in an integrated way to foster economic empowerment, social equality and environmental sustainability.

At the end of the day all of what we are talking about is about people, and making their lives better. Let us not leave the 1.5 billion people behind, again. That is the theme of our consultation on 26-28 February in Timor-Leste in which you are all invited to hear the voices of the g7+ and the Pacific countries.

Thank you.

David Leeming specialises in Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D), both nationally and regionally and has been based in Solomon Islands since 1995. His background and experience allow him to shed some light on how much disaster preparedness has improved in the Solomon Islands since the last major earthquake and tsunami there in 2007.

He writes:

I’d like to pass on my words of sympathy and condolence to the people affected in Temotu, especially the families of those who tragically died and were injured, and the many displaced.

I think that all the evidence shows how remarkably the country’s disaster preparedness have improved since 2007. Congratulations are due to all concerned.

It is certainly true that the warning systems, organisation and response procedures and capacities have greatly improved. The technology available has also come on in leaps and bounds, and is available to anyone. For instance, I now have at my fingertips real time localised earthquake info from an app on my Android phone. The real-time data that is available now compared to the 2007 M8.1 quake/tsunami in Western Province is obviously much more reliable – witness the precise measurement of 91cm wave height recorded at Lata Wharf, that the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) had access to almost immediately.

Looking back to 2007, these tools were less available. It was People First Network that got the first data to PTWC of an actual tsunami event, after the Simbo PFnet station called in to report it. We passed that data to PTWC by telephone and they raised the alert to regional expanding category, and I was told the arrival time would be in the next 5 minutes (an anxious few moments).

In 2007 PFnet was also able to pass on damage assessments and needs of some affected communities, for instance in the Shortlands. I was very interested to read that the social network FSII has reacted quickly, aiming to assist NDMO with information sharing. This is one lesson we can learn – the potential of citizen networks to organise and assist with the response to disaster. This is a technique called crowd sourcing, which is enabled by the increasingly interactive tools available on the Internet (Web2.0). But this kind of networking has its limitations, as the data must be properly verified and the danger of spreading rumours should be avoided. Still, it is a very powerful addition to the “arsenal” for disaster managers.

When observing how the event played out in Honiara, I was reminded that education is a key factor in reducing vulnerability to disasters. There again, the evidence is that people are much more informed and aware – for instance of the need to move to high ground if there is a strong earthquake felt in coastal regions. As NDMO have pointed out, no warning systems are able to react so quickly when the epicentre is close offshore – people need to be informed so as to take responsible action themselves.

However, a panicked response can also be dangerous. One needs to compare the risks of the current threat with those of the response. When an aircraft makes an emergency landing and there may be a need to evacuate, the crew are trained in such risk assessment – evacuating an aircraft often leads to injuries. One recalls the Qantas A380 which made an emergency landing in Singapore some time back; even though the plane was leaking fuel and one engine running could not be shut down, the captain judged that the risk of fire was less than the risk of hurriedly evacuating 500 people.

In Honiara at the time, you had a lot of worry and excitement on the street, with knowledge of possible need to go to high ground, but not really sure whether they should do. I was at home when the quake struck, up on a ridge and not at risk, but my wife was in at her relatives’ house in the White River area of Honiara. She called me and there was a real dilemma, what to do – having everyone including the elderly rushing and panicking to climb up a steep hill might be more risky than staying put. I told her to listen out for any official advice from the nearby Police post. Perhaps there is a need for designated wardens in key areas such as those low valleys with high populations.

And I also said to listen to the radio. Radio has to be a KEY component in disaster management and response. I noticed how SIBC were very effective, on to the job immediately with the “trusted voice” giving the latest updates and official advice. I suppose one message that has to be got across, is that people should listen to the radio at times like this and if they are out and about, try and find a radio to listen to. Mobile phones provide
another channel too (and many have FM radio receivers) but radio is still the most accessible medium.

After such an event, radio (especially community radio) can be very effective in many ways, such as in “counselling” traumatised people, sharing information on misplaced persons, helping to make sure that the response – such as donated materials – is appropriate and that the materials really reach those in most need. Buala FM station was used very effectively in March 2011 when the town suffered a 1m tsunami from the huge quake near Japan. The Police Commander was able to broadcast his words of calming local advice to many people who were very traumatised and worried to go back to their homes. The role of community radio has also been extensively documented in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami.

Leeming’s insights offer some room for optimism and hope in what have been trying times for the people of Solomon Islands. While the piece notes the usefulness of the latest technologies in disaster risk reduction, by highlighting the value of the humble radio in times of disaster, he raises serious questions for donors and government planners in relation to basic, yet essential, communications infrastructure in the Pacific.

By: Frida Bani-Sam

Representation of women in Pacific parliaments is the lowest in the world. Many argue that women playing a leadership role in politics is against tradition, both Christian and kastom. But all Christian customs speak of equality, and if the role of government is to protect the weakest, then surely women have a role to play. So the question is how, not if, women should play a role. Quotas are one way to achieve this.

Women’s rise to power elsewhere in the world hasn’t undermined Christian principles. And arguments concerning women’s role in kastom often ignore important traditions, including matrilineal inheritance. Avenues exist for women to gain certain rights in society, and women have a right to participate in decision making in the community. Admittedly, the practice has recently changed – with land rulings now widely perceived to be male-only domain. But what has changed before can change again.

Today, leadership in the region is widely held to be a men-only domain, and regardless of its more gender-inclusive origins, any challenge to it will encounter fierce opposition using “traditional” customary ideals as their rallying cry. With the exception of French Pacific territories, where the French parity law has enabled equal representation and in Bougainville, which currently reserves 10 seats for its women, this is exactly what is happening across the region. Margareth Tini Parua, a contestant in PNG’s 2012 national election explained it: “They say women don’t stand up in a sing-sing place and speak out on behalf of the clan or tribe, therefore women can’t stand up and speak for us in parliament and speak out on behalf.”

It’s no surprise, then, that Pacific islands are ranked the lowest in the world in terms of women’s political representation, with women holding a meager 3.65 percent of of seats. This is a far cry from number one ranked Rwanda, at 56.3 percent.

The discourse on electoral gender quotas in the Pacific is having trouble gaining traction. In response to a move for 10 reserved seats in the country’s legislature in 2014, Solomon Islands PM Gordon Darcy Lilo frankly stated his government’s preference to address this issue as a development approach, but not a rights approach.

In Papua New Guinea, a move in 2011 for 22 reserved seats in its 111 seat national assembly died in parliament. Even PNG’s three newly elected women MPs do not support the bill, threatening to withdraw from the government if the bill is reintroduced. In 2012, an attempt to amend the Samoan constitution to allow five reserved seats for women also failed. In Fiji, national women’s groups have issued a radical demand for half of all parliamentary seats to be reserved for women. How Fiji’s military government will respond to this request remains to be seen.

Quotas don’t have to be permanent. In Bougainville, special treatment in the form of reserved seats provide a short term way to immediately increase the number of women in parliament – while longer term strategies will continue to be implemented. Quotas will only be in place until the barriers blocking gender parity are removed. They will be reconsidered when the country’s constitutional review is due.

Detractors often argue that quotas are unfair and distort the democratic process – that a quota restricts freedom of choice. Many see it as an affront, granting special rights to women above and beyond those accorded to others.

Quotas, they say, tokenise women, and imply that they are undeserving. They may also limit women’s representation beyond the fixed quota level. The Bougainville case reveals that quotas can enable and also limit women’s participation. Some have argued that that although the reserved seats provision is enabling a wide acceptance of female parliamentarians, women are rarely contesting the 33 open seats, and when they do, they suffer overwhelming defeat. This suggests that Bougainville voters are not supportive of women contesting open seats, believing the quota awards them sufficient representation already.

But quota advocates contend that the active involvement of women in decision-making is essential to eliminating poverty. Now, national decisions made by parliaments often ignore women’s grievances and priorities, which often contrast starkly with mens’. Female leaders generally support policy choices that reflect communities’ preferences.

Is it necessary – or even possible – to force people to see the light? The principle of equality is a social attitude, but legislation plays a critical role in shaping this attitude. Quotas impose re-thinking and change perceptions. Consider India’s experience with quota implementation, where in every election, one third of the villages must elect a female mayor by rotation. The quota has successfully eroded the bias after just five years of experimentation: “People have a limited choice in the first election, but we observe that they become more likely to elect a woman in the following elections even when they are not constrained”

Contrary to assumptions that gender quotas distort the democratic process, they strengthen democracy by widening the pool of participants. Democracy is based not just on the premise that all people are born equal, but also the assumption that everyone recognises and respects that fact. Current prejudices against women reveal this is not the case. Quotas will level unfair psychological grounds so that what prejudice denies women in the mind, the law restores in practice.

The internet is putting down tenuous roots in the Pacific – but do we really understand how to foster its growth?

By: Dan McGarry

Over the last year or so, we’ve seen a string of articles and papers about the small but sudden growth of the internet throughout the Pacific region. Ranging in tone between cautious optimism and untempered –and often uncritical– enthusiasm, few capture the essence of the struggle that Pacific island states face even keeping pace with the rate of change in the world of telecommunications and the internet.

When I first arrived in Vanuatu the better part of a decade ago, the entire country was sharing only slightly more bandwidth than I’d had at my personal disposal back in Canada. To add insult to injury, the cost was roughly ten times greater even for the paltry amounts on sale. Getting access to what would be considered even a nominal connection in the developed world involved expenditures equivalent to thousands of dollars a month.

Now, following years of consistent and determined effort, Vanuatu has widely available commercial internet in its urban areas. But prices remain high. As this piece is being written, the cost of a 2 megabit connection (the lowest tier of what is considered broadband in many developed nations) starts at about AUD800 per month, and rises quickly once usage fees are factored in.

In spite of this, internet service providers have found inventive ways to get people started, offering small (cynics might say paltry) connection speeds and bandwidth limits. Comparisons aside, such packages are at least sufficient to move the uptake indicator from effectively zero to… something slightly more than zero.

Make no mistake; that first step is a doozy. It’s allowed tens of thousands of people who never had any access at all to begin using the internet on a regular basis. As many a breathless commentator (including myself, on occasion) has noted, this has led to a vast increase in public dialogue online. This has led in turn to equally breathless speculation about the likelihood of a coming revolution in political awareness and activism, social justice, education and countless other shibboleths of progressive idealism.

With a few notable exceptions, commentators ignore key details about this incipient social revolution:

First, this ‘revolution’ resembles Iran’s Green movement more than Egypt’s uprising. In the vast majority of Pacific countries, price and availability limit access to all but a tiny proportion of the population. And these people are almost exclusively urban, affluent and educated. In short, they are already the best informed and most engaged. Simple arithmetic leads to the conclusion that limited access to internet limits the scope of its impact as well.

Second, the results of public dialogue, awareness and coordination on politics are measurable, but decidedly mixed. In Papua New Guinea, we saw a number of new faces in Parliament whose election can at least in part be attributed to the profile they garnered by participating in online fora such as Facebook’s Sharp Talk group. But we also saw many familiar faces returned, some of whom were widely reviled online. The same can be said of Vanuatu, where populist MP Ralph Regenvanu repeated his record-setting electoral performance, successfully expanded his base and managed to elect three other MPs under his Graon Mo Jastis (Land and Justice) banner. Regenvanu is the first politician since Independence to run an entirely issues-oriented campaign, and his appeal has only been amplified by his consistent presence online.

But popularity didn’t help Regenvanu on the tactical level. He won enough votes individually that, due to the vagaries of Vanuatu’s Single Non-Transferable Vote system (which elects multiple MPs in each constituency), he could have got three MPs past the post. Failures in messaging and on-the-ground organising, however, meant that his party’s second candidate in the capital constituency barely missed capturing the necessary votes to get him past the post.

More to the point, Vanuatu too saw many familiar faces returned to Parliament. While its future seems uncertain, the current cabinet is nearly identical to the one that led the country to the polls only weeks ago. Even if it is ousted in the coming days, the champions and heroes of the small but growing online community can hope for a minority voice at best in any new government.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, commentators and researchers often underestimate the fragility of this flowering in the digital sphere and overstate its importance relative to other uses of digital communications. Despite the occasional public bun fight over self-censorship and media standards, it’s becoming increasingly clear that the Fiji government has been quite successful in its efforts to ‘raise standards’ across the spectrum of media, both online and off, and to introduce ‘balance’. The stifling effects of official disapproval on certain kinds of commentary and content in Fiji are making themselves felt throughout the online community. They reach so far that it’s becoming harder to engage writers to perform any kind of independent analysis of government policy, ironically, even to praise it.

But to express unmitigated dismay at this outcome would be naïve, to say the least. Given that Fiji has the most highly developed telecommunications infrastructure in the region, and that the current regime has presided over its significant growth and improvement, why should we be surprised if they prove adept at making sure it serves their purposes? There is a very real chilling effect generated by the imposition of state views on the public dialogue, that’s true. But simply to write off the region-leading gains that have been made in telecommunications pricing and availability –as a recent Lowy paper did– is a textbook case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

In last week’s budget speech, Voreqe Bainimarama committed his government to building ten new telecentres in the coming year, and to removing duties entirely from smart phones in order to encourage uptake across the board. Informal reports indicate as well that there are plans afoot to provide broadband access to ‘almost 100%’ of the nation’s schools within the next four years.

It may be a source of discomfort for some, but the plain fact is that Fiji is a regional leader in understanding and embracing the importance of broad and deep investment in telecommunications capacity. They see their role in the coming years as that of a ‘knowledge hub’ for the Pacific. Improved communications capacity, therefore, does not necessarily equate to increased freedom of speech, nor indeed the flowering of a diverse and broad-based social dialogue. This should not be news to us.

Political and social change may indeed be happening in Fiji, but it’s happening on the government’s terms.

Melanesian and Polynesian societies all feature tight familial bonds and a preference for dialogue over confrontation. It’s not at all surprising, then, to see online groups arise whose membership comprises the majority of the online community. Hunger for change is often evident, but it’s not overwhelming. There are in fact deeply conservative aspects to Pacific societies that can counterbalance and often quash an individual’s ability to enact change. Wantok-ism and a long tradition of respect for the so-called Big Man can overwhelm the desire to challenge the powers that be.

If only to view the development of internet in the Pacific more clearly, it’s useful to look at online discourse and the networks that make it possible as separate, but linked endeavours. Building out infrastructure widely and deeply are necessary preconditions to achieving the progressive ends we most commonly associate with social media. But in and of themselves, they are not sufficient.

When we look at the landscape through this split prism, we can learn important lessons about how to achieve the former. The same paper that was so quick to toss aside Fiji’s recent gains ascribed the massive expansion of mobile services in the region to ‘deregulation’. Actually, the opposite is true. Virtually every successful step taken in this sector has been the result of increased government engagement in telecommunications: by requiring (sometimes foisting) competition on incumbent monopolies, intervening when players tried to ignore or alter the rules, by closing the door to the back room and by giving their regulatory authorities the ability to bite back.

This may discomfit some, but in the Pacific it seems that more government, not less, is the recipe for success in terms of making the internet a part of their peoples’ lives. While Digicel’s example may have shown that even small markets can be profitable, the relatively large investments required to build out international fibre-optic links and robust nationwide networks carrying more than token bandwidth to the entire country are enough to make even the most risk-loving enterprise blanch. Simply put, no matter how much demand ensues, the capital investment costs per customer are astronomical.

It’s been argued that the only way a commercial entity can countenance such an investment is through a monopoly arrangement –the very thing that Pacific countries have spent the better part of a decade getting out from under. But even when other approaches are tried, the numbers are daunting. Tonga’s undersea cable connection to Fiji is heavily subsidised by the World Bank, and it’s being developed on a consortium basis, but the government the largest shareholder by a wide margin. Even with all of these interventions, prices promise to remain extremely high.

Simply put, it’s nearly impossible to make a profit-based business case for the kind of connectivity that will be required to provide affordable, widely accessible internet services in the Pacific. And those voice and data companies who do invest in the region will go to great lengths to protect their investment, up to and including interfering in the political process. The Pacific’s success (or failure) in embracing information technologies, therefore, will be determined by the level of commitment and firmness of will shown by government.

Even under the best possible circumstances, any gains will likely be tenuous. Renesys, the internet consulting group that broke the news of national internet blackouts in Iran, Egypt and more recently in Syria, recently used their international traffic monitoring tools to find out which countries were most vulnerable to disruptions in internet service. Needless to say, Pacific island countries were over-represented among those faced with ‘Severe’ or ‘Significant’ risk. Not even Fiji managed to find its way into the ‘Low’ risk category.

Renesys was worried mostly about the ease with which a government could turn off the internet tap for its own people. That may be a worry for some in the region, too, but those very same attributes that make national networks vulnerable to political interference also make them vulnerable to systemic threats. In 2004, the failure of a single satellite resulted in numerous nations going entirely dark, some for days. As the Renesys survey shows, little has changed in the interim.

If –and as we’ve seen, it’s a big if– Pacific nations do somehow succeed in integrating the internet into people’s daily lives, we still have no guarantee a flowering of awareness and online dialogue will necessarily follow. Once again, those in power will play an over-large role. No matter what decisions they make, there will be winners and losers at the top. Canny politicians and parties will follow the example set both by the insurgents in Vanuatu and PNG and by the incumbents in Fiji. Those who are adept at messaging and dialogue will likely flourish. Those who remain aloof, who ignore or refuse to take up these new social tools, will slowly (too slowly for some) but inevitably find themselves pushed to the sidelines. But they may succeed in slowing development for years before that happens.

The revolution, in other words, may not be digitised; there may not be any revolution at all. Every outcome, for better or for worse, will be determined by the will of governments to act.

Beijing University of Science and Technology graduation

By Trevor Banga

In this piece I draw upon my experience of living and studying in China for 5 years between 2006 and 2011. I also draw on wide reading of both English and Chinese language reports and websites. My experience and research underpin the views outlined in what follows.

China’s impact on economic development in the Pacific

From my experience as a student in China for five years I have a particular perspective on China and its relationships in the Pacific and the world. First, I agree with some Pacific island countries seeking closer collaboration, discussing enhanced cooperation and establishing diplomatic ties with China.

I think China’s engagement with the Pacific offers some positive prospects for the region.

In the long term, Pacific island countries should welcome the growth of China’s economy and the larger role that it will be likely to play in the Pacific as a result. Already, Vice Foreign Minister Cui has cited concrete measures taken by China to promote economic and social development in the Pacific. Development wise, most island countries require development assistance and China’s economic power and perhaps some of its economic models could assist us. Those Pacific island countries that already have relationships with China can strengthen cooperation and explore market opportunities stemming from the growing consumerism in China. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has noted that PNG, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu have established relatively strong diplomatic relations with China. Tourism is another key area. With a population of over one billion and a growing middle class, opportunities to attract Chinese tourists to our shores are better than ever. Pacific island countries can do more to try and tap into the growing Chinese interest in overseas travel, especially by emphasising our differing cultures and our beautiful beaches and blue waters. During a visit to Fiji from top Chinese legislator Wu Bangguo in September, Xinhua, a Chinese government media source commented on the beautiful islands and oceans. We in the Pacific islands should be gearing up to maximise the potential of China’s economic strength.

Reflections on my time in China at the Beijing University of Science and Technology

Pacific island countries need to know more about China. While China has signed agreements with some Pacific island countries for study scholarships, many are yet to formalise such relationships. While Fiji, PNG, Tonga and Samoa are able to send around 20 students to study in various fields every year, other countries such as my home, Vanuatu, tend to send fewer students. One attractive aspect of study in China is that a number of courses are taught in English, especially those in the areas of science and technology. China’s increasing level of engagement and openness to the world means that more and more foreign students want to go and study there. Chinese students are extremely determined and are known for their ability to study hard, so much so, that when I first arrived in China I felt as though I was a ten year old competing with twenty year old students. I remember being shocked when my Chinese classmates told me they had started learning calculus in primary school, when in Vanuatu, we didn’t begin until our senior years of study. However, my classmates were almost always able to speak English and were happy to answer any questions I had. So, I would encourage people interested in studying in China to not be scared by issues of a language barrier.  We can say it is too hard because of the language barrier but to convince you better, in every Chinese university students can speak English and now in most universities, science courses are offered in English.

Another thing I learned from my university experience was that most of the Chinese professors could speak and teach in English but wouldn’t tell you unless you specifically asked them to explain something to you in English. Also interesting was that whenever Chinese people met foreign students they tended to assume that we must be spending a lot of money to be in China to study. But when they learned that some of us were actually there on a scholarship with funding from the Chinese government, they seemed confused and almost betrayed. Many of these students had subsistence farmers for parents and they didn’t understand why the government was helping us so much and the government only gives them one third of their tuition fees. My PhD student friend told me he needed to keep studying until he achieved the highest possible level of education because he wanted to have more than one child, something that we here in Vanuatu take for granted. This was interesting to me since most people in the Pacific know about China’s growing influence in our region and their use of soft power in terms of offering loans and scholarships, however most Chinese youth appeared to have no idea about such things and seemed to resent the fact that we were getting help and they weren’t.

The key message I want to get across to Pacific island countries is that we should seek to benefit as much as we can from the Chinese education system. It is not as hard as many would think to study in China, with large numbers of students from the Pacific already undertaking undergraduate and advanced degrees in their respective fields of study. Another point I want to convey about this experience in China is that Chinese people are really friendly and welcoming and I remember having many, many interesting and enjoyable conversations while studying there. They were always generous with their help for my Pacific friends and I in our studies if we found anything hard and they never expected or asked for anything in return. The standard of education is high in China and studying there is good preparation for further study too.

China, creating more dialogue with the Pacific

A kind tone is used across the Chinese language websites and a willingness to give support to the Pacific countries is strongly conveyed. The website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai attended the 24th Post-Forum Dialogue Meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) held in Cook Islands. The ministry reported this event straight from the Xinhua media just one day later because the Chinese government recognises the significance of an event that brings together all the island countries and that China has good relations with them. It is evident that China attaches great importance to developing relationships with Pacific island countries. Cui also introduced China’s new initiatives to support island countries to achieve economic sustainable development, develop and protect marine resources, cope with climate change, and fulfil the Millennium Development Goals. Fiji has greatly increased engagement with China over the past decade and has publicly shared its appreciation of China’s efforts in promoting economic and social development. Other Pacific countries too, have expressed enthusiasm about working with China over a wide range of issues.

While Chinese aid has been greatly appreciated by many countries, exact numbers have proved difficult to come by, with China hesitant to share detailed information on such spending.

It is difficult make sure with any certainty the size of China’s aid programme because of a lack of public information. The government websites and media don’t really give out aid information in advance but wait till six months or a year later before making information public.

Cui Tiankai told Pacific leaders in September that China actively carries out friendly exchanges with Pacific island countries on the basis of adhering to the fifth principle of the Communist Party of China. The fifth principle relates to the following areas:

• Supporting and ensuring state power is properly exercised, with sufficient consultation on major state policies and choice of state leaders, state affairs laws and regulations
• Promoting a socialist deliberative democracy
• Improving systems of grass-roots democracy
• Comprehensively promoting the rule of law
• Deepening administrative reform
• Improving operation of power constraints and supervision
• Consolidating and developing stable state relations, regardless of changing political situations

These principles are relevant to foreign policy plus diplomacy and also inform aid programmes

The embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand reports that China’s policies towards island countries are aimed at promoting peace, seeking stability, and pursuing development. The news reports also say that China will always put the needs and interests of island countries in first place and strive to do more practical work for the economic and social development of island countries. I think China has a lot to offer Pacific countries in terms of education opportunities and aid and I consider China our friend.

The rise of China has presented the Pacific with greater access and opportunities for development from an extremely large, emerging economy. We here in Pacific island countries should make the most from this opportunity. We should consider becoming more willing to live with and interact with Chinese people and to immerse ourselves Chinese society via university exchanges and scholarships. These programmes can provide us with a new way of visualising the world and give us unique insights into China and its people.

Australian and New Zealand peace keepers talk with villagers in the aftermath of the Bougainville uprising. Photo credit: Ben Bohane – wakaphotos.com

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the most diverse nation in the Pacific island region, and possibly the world. In PNG alone, there are more than 800 different language groups. Cultural practices and traditions vary from place to place. Further, the human diversity is compounded by its topography. The open seas, rivers, mountains, valleys, marshlands and so forth are natural barriers to communities interacting. The lack of affinity to a nation is understandable given the isolation and insulated existence of communities since time immemorial.

Most communities within PNG only came into sustained contact with each other after  World War II. The nation remains a vague entity. The nation as a form of political entity has little significance to populations who have relied for thousands of years on the immediate security provided by the clan and tribal unit. Bonds in clans and tribes are created, and reinforced through familial and genealogical connections, institutionalised rituals and communal endeavors and sustained levels of exchanges and linguistic similarities.

The lack of any sense of nationalism affects the development of PNG as a modern nation. A common national identity is an important prerequisite for PNG’s development. Since independence, White and Wainwright have argued that the lack of any sense of nationhood has been at the root of many problems the country has faced. Law and order problems in PNG highlight this. Dinnen has attributed the law and order problems in PNG to a lack of any ‘sense of common identity’, as amplified by a relatively short exposure to centralised administration.

Amidst all its socio-cultural complexities, linguistic diversity and the limited historical connections amongst its peoples, how has the nation fared since independence? In the lead-up to independence in 1975, the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) undertook a momentous exercise of writing the constitution of PNG. The Constitution represents the collective will and aspirations of the people of PNG following what Gelu described as an ‘exhaustive’ process of consultation.

In their attempts to find homogeneity in PNG’s diversity, the National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDPs) were envisaged. The CPC also recognised PNG’s diversity as a national ideology. One is bound to hear references to slogans such as ‘Unity in Diversity’. Such proclamations acknowledge the resilience of Papua New Guineans to co-exist as a united nation. It celebrates tolerance of each other’s cultural and linguistic differences. However ‘Unity in Diversity’ has its limitations.

Urbanised settings in PNG are central locations where cultural, linguistic and regional groups find themselves living together. Outbreaks of fights and skirmishes in urban areas such as Port Moresby, Lae and Mount Hagen have always been among differing tribal, regional or linguistic groups.  In contemporary PNG, it is a dual reality for citizens. Papua New Guineans source their identity and security from both their primordial connections while abiding by the ‘top-down’discourses extolling PNG’s national unity.

A case in point was in the aftermath of the violence at the Gordon Market in Port Moresby in early 2011. The Gordon incident saw two different ethnic groups from the Highlands region of PNG going on a rampage. No visible sense of authority exists in a place where different groups seem to counterbalance each other’s numerical strength. Triggered by the mindless alcohol-induced acts of one youth, the subsequent violence resulted in the death of several persons. Immediately after this incident, non-Highland groups condemned the acts as barbaric and uncivilised. Some Papuans even called for the repatriation of highlanders back to their provinces.

Marginalisation of customary landowners and control over land has shown that localism will override any sense of affinity to fellow citizens of the nation. The events that led to the Bougainville civil war had the same ‘insider-outsider’ features. Indigenous Bougainvilleans felt that they were encroached upon by mainland Papua New Guineans. The resentments resulted in a fully fledged civil war that spanned almost a decade and saw more than 20,000 people killed. Nation building is therefore a challenge. The reality in PNG, as in other Melanesian countries, is that the nation is not the only source of identity and security. There are social units such as the tribe whose existence have more direct bearing and legitimacy on peoples’ lives. The challenge: development and other forms of interventions in PNG and Melanesian countries should be informed by the diversities in this part of the world. There will definitely be no quick-fix or universal models of development for ‘nations’ that to date do not exist.